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Prefatory Remarks
T w enty-fiv e  years after its first publication, Mythologies is 
still the most widely read of all Barthes’s works. It gained 
for its author the reputation of being a ‘committed’ writer: a de­
scription which sat uneasily on Barthes’s shoulders in later years. 
Whilst for many readers -  specialist and non-specialist alike -  
Mythologies represents the quintessential Barthes, admirers of 
a so-called postmodern Barthes tend to be less enamoured: one 
recent study which purports to clarify the ‘inner dynamics of 
[Barthes’s] career’ manages to avoid a single mention of 
Mythologies in its two hundred pages. This tendency to find 
Barthes’s more overtly ‘political’ work somehow embarrassing 
was no doubt encouraged by the fact that the author himself dis­
avowed Mythologies on a number of occasions, not least in the 
preface to the 1970 edition which sits like a disapproving 
guardian at the threshold of that volume.
The present study attempts simply to elucidate Barthes’s pro­
ject in Mythologies, and to set the work in its historical and intel­
lectual context. Myth is thus examined in relation to semiology, 
ideology and literature. At each stage fresh problems arise, 
which are then taken up at a different level. A brief consideration 
of the place of Mythologies within Barthes’s oeuvre is reserved 
chiefly for the concluding chapter.
References to Mythologies are to the 1970 paperback edition 
published by Seuil in the ‘Points’ collection. Other references in 
the text are to numbered items in the select bibliography situated 
at the end of the volume. I would like to thank Annette Lavers, 
Roger Little, and Dorothy Stein, whose comments on the type­
script helped me to produce a clearer and more readable book.
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i) L u tter  avec u n e  certaine  in n o c e n c e  d es  o b je ts
I t  could all start in the street. A man in the street, Barthes. To­
wards the end of Rue Gambetta he receives an unexpected 
and importunate summons: a charming little chalet, white with 
exposed joists and an asymmetrical red-tiled roof. The chalet 
appeals to him directly, aggressively; it demands to be named: 
it is a basque chalet. More than that: it demands that Barthes 
recognize it to be the very essence of Basqueness.
Alternatively, it could already have started with another man 
in the street; this one is called Roquentin. He has been bothered 
for some months by an experience he had in the municipal art 
gallery (28, pp. 132-34). The large room adorned with the por­
traits of the Third Republic notables who laid the foundations 
of the town’s prosperity is disquieting enough in itself: the 
faces which look down on him are the expression of pure 
Value: they speak of values such as Property, Order, the Family, 
values from which Roquentin, as an unmarried, unpropertied 
marginal, has disqualified himself. He is isolated by the singu­
larity of his vision. But one portrait in particular has given him 
food for thought; there is something slightly wrong about 
Olivier Blévigne, and Roquentin now knows what it is: Blé
vigne is the same height as all the other worthies who surround 
him in the gallery, but in life he was virtually a dwarf. The 
artist could hardly commit such a disobliging image to poster­
ity, so he surrounds his model with miniature objects in order 
to exaggerate his stature. Unfortunately, the delicate pedestal 
table in his portrait appears almost as large as the enormous 
table in a neighbouring painting. It was this instinctive visual 
comparison which had caused Roquentin’s unease: ‘admirable 
puissance de l’art’!
Roquentin is not alone in the gallery; he is accompanied on 
his round by a respectful couple who find the portraits so life­
like that they expect them, at any moment, to start moving. He 
feels no inclination to destroy their illusions: they would offer 
him no thanks. The jouissance he feels at having uncovered the 
lie is satisfaction enough in itself.
The whole of Mythologies is already contained in this scene 
from Sartre’s La Nausée: the myth itself, its naï ve readers, or 
victims, and the ‘mythologist’ who already knows why the myth 
is proffered -  and the ends to which it is destined -  but who in 
addition is able to explain, and thereby demystify, its structure. 
Like Roquentin, Barthes is not content with ‘pious denunci­
ations’: the demonstration of how myth functions plays an evi­
dential role in the overriding enterprise of denouncing the uses 
to which it is put in our society. But unlike Roquentin, Barthes is 
not content with the solitary pleasures of lucidity; his aim is to 
cause the scales to fall from the eyes of the naïve reader: after 
Barthes a publicity photograph, an advertisement, a wrestling 
match, even a hairstyle, will never be the same again.
It must be said that the images and objects which Barthes 
analyses in Mythologies are, for the most part, produced by a 
sleight of hand of an altogether more devious nature than the 
simple trick of perspective in the Blévigne portrait: for Barthes, 
the other portraits in the gallery -  so apparently natural and life­
like -  would be more potent mythical objects.
The posture of isolation and singularity which Barthes cul­
tivates in Mythologies presupposes an already-existing critical 
distance from the ideological representations of the society in 
which he finds himself. That is, he grasps the meaning of these 
representations before he is able to analyse the ways in which 
that meaning is constructed. It is possible, then, to discern two 
facets of myth: on the one hand, myth as a signifying practice 
(the semiological), and on the other, the uses to which that signi­
fying practice is put in our modem societies (the ideological).
Although it may be impossible in practice to maintain the 
separation of the semiological and the ideological for very long,
I shall start by following Barthes in his analysis of the way myth 
is constructed. This first -  descriptive -  movement is clearly
The Life o f Signs 9
1 0 Mythologies
intended as a gesture towards ‘scientificity’; later, we will have 
to consider the significance of this gesture for Barthes himself.
The activity of the mythologist is one of decipherment, but to 
decipher, wrote Barthes, is always to struggle against ‘une cer- 
taine innocence des objets’ (72, p. 228). I propose therefore to 
follow Barthes, for a few rounds, in this struggle.
It has long been recognized that items of clothing have the 
capacity to signify something about their wearer above and be­
yond his simple desire to keep warm or hide his nakedness. 
Every garment, from the luxurious fur-coat to the hard-wearing 
pair of jeans, has a ready-made connotation which we ‘put on’ 
along with the garment. The same could be said of hairstyles. 
The blue-rinse, the skin-head, the flat-top, the dreadlocks, the ir­
ritatingly boyish fringe of the middle-aged executive: all of these 
styles carry their own social, economic, cultural — even moral — 
connotations. But what of the simple haircut? The term implies 
the accomplishment of a natural necessity (hair must be cut 
when it becomes impractically long) rather than a desire to make 
some sort of statement. The majority of haircuts seem to aim at a 
kind of neutrality: not too short, not too long, tidy without being 
obsessively plastered to the skull, casual without being unkempt. 
In short, insignificant. But Barthes’s essay ‘Iconographie de 
l’abbé Pierre’ casts serious doubt on the possibility of this neu­
trality.
‘Abbé Pierre’ was the resistance nom de guerre of a certain 
Henri Grouès; a former Franciscan friar, Grouès was a curé at 
the time Barthes was writing. The extremely harsh winter of 
1953-54 had drawn attention to the housing crisis and the gov­
ernment’s inadequate response to it: the homeless were dying of 
cold. Abbé Pierre organized a charity drive which was taken up 
by large sections of the media.1 His hairstyle would seem in it­
self to be irreproachable in its very muteness, ‘à moitié rase, 
sans apprêt et surtout sans forme’ (p. 54). It says nothing, and 
there would appear to be nothing to be said about it, either es-
1 In 1990 he was back in the news, with a new book and a film (Hiver 54) 
devoted to him.
The Life o f Signs 1 1
thetically or technically -  it is innocent, a kind of ‘état zéro de la 
coupe’. But this is where the problems begin. In linguistics, the 
term ‘degré zéro’, which provided Barthes with the title of his 
first book, designates, for example, the indicative as an affective­
ly neutral mood between the imperative and the subjunctive 
moods, and Barthes had used it in order to characterize certain 
modem forms of writing which aimed at neutrality, or blankness, 
as a means of rejecting the dominant form of traditional literary 
writing. Barthes’s point was that even this blankness or neutral­
ity, once recognized as such, could be taken up and used to signi­
fy itself, thus toppling over from neutrality into mannerism. The 
haircut of Abbé Pierre is destined to take the same tumble: ‘c’est 
qu’ici comme ailleurs, la neutralité finit par fonctionner comme 
signe de la neutralité’ (p. 54). When Saint Francis of Assisi first 
adopted the style it was intended to reinforce the insignificance 
of his person: the saint is the epitome of self-abnegation: the 
apostolate does not easily accommodate the dictates of fashion. 
But this is a trick which cannot be repeated: the hairstyle of 
Abbé Pierre inexorably advertises him as a Franciscan; worse 
still, ‘elle déguise l’abbé en saint François’ (p. 54).
The hapless friar may have thought that he was effacing him­
self beneath this supremely neutral haircut, but his head and his 
chin (he sports a beard also, of course) find themselves abruptly 
covered with a forest of signs; he has called down upon his head 
all the connotations which history has attached to Franciscanism: 
disregard of the conventions of this temporal existence, mission­
ary zeal, poverty, the common touch. In ecclesiastical circles one 
does not wear a beard with impunity: ‘porter la barbe, c’est ex­
plorer d’un même coeur la Zone, la Britonnie ou le Nyassaland’ 
(p. 55).
The point Barthes is making in this essay (as, indeed, in all 
the other essays in Mythologies) is that there is no such thing as 
a non-significant or innocent object; or, at any rate, that there is 
no object whose innocence is so resistant, whose virtue is so in­
transigent, that it cannot be transformed by the superimposition 
of cultural connotations into what Barthes calls a myth. No-one 
is accusing Abbé Pierre of the cynical and cunning exploitation 
of these cultural codes -  the metamorphosis of his hairstyle into
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myth takes place ‘à l’insu de l’abbé, il faut le souhaiter’ -  rather, 
the point at which the myth comes into being is marked by the 
Abbé’s entry into the media-machine: he appears in a film, albeit 
in the person of the actor Reybaz; he is the subject of feature 
articles in glossy magazines such as Paris Match.
The common concern of Mythologies is, precisely, with 
demonstrating how the organs of mass culture suck in the raw 
materials of everyday life and transform them into modem 
myths. As the title of this particular essay indicates, the man of 
flesh and blood becomes a myth when he is transformed into a 
schematic image, an icon. The question remains as to why the 
media -  through their iconography -  should devote such energy 
to elevating the unassuming abbé to the status of saint. The 
answer, as often in Mythologies, comes at the end. The myth of 
Abbé Pierre serves to sanctify charity, whilst naturalizing, and 
excusing, the very situation which charity is intended to palliate: 
‘je m’inquiète d’une société’, says Barthes, ‘qui consomme si 
avidement l’affiche de la charité qu’elle en oublie de s’interroger 
sur ses conséquences, ses emplois et ses limites’ (pp. 55-56). 
That is, it is easier to consume the signs of charity, than to work 
towards a social organization in which charity would no longer 
be required. A given image of Abbé Pierre has, in the first in­
stance, a literal meaning for its beholder; this is purely analog­
ical insofar as the image denotes the man of flesh and blood 
through its resemblance to him. But in a second movement a 
parasitic bundle of connotations attaches itself, through usage, 
to this image: it is when the two levels of meaning — denoted 
and connoted — work in tandem that the myth is fully constituted.
The producer of myth and the decipherer of myth (or 
‘mythologist’) approach the problem of the innocence of the ob­
ject from diametrically opposed points of view. For the former, it 
is essential that the object retain an appearance of innocence: the 
most efficacious mythical objects are those which do not appear 
to be mythical at all. The mythologist, on the other hand, grap­
ples with this spurious innocence in an attempt to reveal the 
depths of tendentiousness it conceals. This struggle is well illus­
trated by two other essays: ‘Le vin et le lait’ and ‘Le bifteck et 
les frites’.
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Barthes detects several layers of meaning in the humble glass 
of wine, above and beyond its substantial reality; or, perhaps, 
which are in practice inseparable from this reality. And therein 
lies the difficulty. This multiplicity of mythical schemas is also 
indicative of the range of theoretical models Barthes is capable 
of bringing to bear on his objects. A ‘phenomenological’ anal­
ysis reveals that wine is the distilled essence of earth and sun; 
and that, despite its evident liquidity, it partakes more of the 
mythology of dryness than of wetness. In addition to this, and 
often in contradiction to it, wine has been an element of popular 
folklore and mythology for as long as it has been produced. But 
the popular mythology of wine is not embarrassed by contradic­
tions: wine will not only warm you up on a cold winter’s day, it 
will also cool you down at the height of a Provençal summer. 
When victims are in short supply, vampires could well quench 
their thirst with a glass of claret, since wine is a sanguine sub­
stance. It endows the taciturn with a startling loquacity, and it 
turns a mouse into a man. Nothing is better able to rouse a man 
from sombre melancholy, but when a man is ‘in his cups’ the 
chances are that wine put him there. It is, then, ‘une substance de 
conversion, capable de retourner les situations et les états’ (p. 
74). All things to all men.
There is nothing particularly original in these remarks; as 
Barthes himself says, ‘Tout cela est connu’ (p. 75). But what is 
interesting is the very fact that ‘all of that’ is supposedly ‘well- 
known’. For wine is also a ‘totem vivace’. The term is well-cho­
sen. The totem -  as analysed by the anthropologist Lévi-Strauss 
and others -  is the signifier of an invisible network of relations 
of belonging and exclusion. Seen in this way, wine is a social­
ized, even a nationalized substance. It is, says Barthes, a national 
property (in both senses of the word: possession and attribute) 
and no less a national property than France’s three hundred and 
sixty types of cheese . . . and its culture (p. 74). Somehow, wine, 
or the drinking of it, has become the acid-test of patriotism; for 
once, the French dictum of ‘chacun à son goût’ ceases to be an 
excuse: to refuse a glass of wine, or to declare a distaste for it, is 
tantamount to revoking one’s French nationality: ‘le Français qui 
prendrait quelque distance à l’égard du mythe s’exposerait à des
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problèmes menus mais précis d’intégration, dont le premier 
serait justement d’avoir à s’expliquer’ (p. 75). To fall foul of this 
shibboleth could entail complications only marginally less dra­
matic than those experienced by the Ephraimites at the hands of 
the Gileadites. Witness the national outcry provoked by M. Coty 
whose presidential term of office was marred by the blunder of 
allowing himself to be photographed with a bottle of mineral 
water rather than the ubiquitous bottle of wine which was the 
indispensable backdrop to all Gallic rites, from a game of tarot 
in the local bar to a presidential inauguration; or witness the 
ridicule heaped on Mendes-France for his promotion of milk. 
The terms in which the extreme right-wing politician Pierre Pou- 
jade denounced the latter give an idea of the collusion between 
insidious racism and economics in this particular myth: ‘Si vous 
aviez une goutte de sang gaulois dans les veines [Mendès-France 
was a Jew], vous n’auriez jamais osé, vous, représentant de notre 
France producteur mondial de vin et de champagne, vous faire 
servir un verre de lait dans une réception intemationale! C’est 
une gifle, monsieur Mendès, que tout Français a reçue ce jour-là, 
même s’il n’est pas un ivrogne’ (25, p. 65).
All of this may seem like a heavy burden to place on a 
simple glass of wine. Is Barthes not guilty of ‘making a mount­
ain out of a molehill’, of over-intellectualizing for effect? The fact 
is that a glass of wine is indubitably also just a glass of wine. It 
is objectively pleasing to contemplate, pleasing to smell and even 
more pleasing to drink. That is to say, it retains a certain essen­
tial, or functional innocence. This is what Barthes calls the ‘am- 
biguïté habituelle de notre vie quotidienne’: the fact, for exam­
ple, that one cannot drink a glass of wine without simultaneously 
drinking the nationalistic myth which attaches to it. Barthes bap­
tizes this ultimate mythical signified ‘francité’. Even, or espe­
cially, not to drink is still to situate oneself vis-à-vis this neb­
ulous concept of ‘Frenchness’.
Barthes confronts the problem again in his next essay, when 
wrestling with the imperturbable innocence of a plate of steak 
and chips. An American in Paris (or any other outsider, for that 
matter) could take a decisive first step towards integration and 
acceptance by walking into a café and ordering ‘steak-frites’.
The Life o f Signs 15
But all the good work could be undone in a moment of rashness, 
were he to specify that he would prefer to have his steak ‘bien 
cuit’, or, even worse, ‘carbonisé’. The waiter’s countenance 
would darken, his lips would pinch into a disapproving pout, and 
he would depart, but not before pronouncing sinister mutterings 
about ‘these foreigners’. What has happened? What unwritten 
totemic law has been transgressed? One could say, in linguistic 
terms, that the size, shape and quality of the steak are -  as far as 
this particular myth is concerned -  ‘redundant’ features; the 
truly ‘pertinent’ feature of the French myth of 'le bifteck’ is how 
cooked it is. For the steak participates in the same sanguine 
mythology as wine: ‘Le sanguin est la raison d’être du bifteck’ 
(p. 78). When a steak is ‘saignant’ it suggests the blood gushing 
from the freshly slaughtered beast; when it is ‘bleu’, the pulsing 
of arterial blood is evoked; even when it is ‘à point’ (barely 
browned on the outside), this term -  which seemingly denotes a 
state of perfection -  connotes in reality the absolute limit beyond 
which the steak would become not just insipid, but morally am­
biguous! As Barthes says, ‘Manger le bifteck saignant représente 
donc à la fois une nature et une morale’ (p. 78, my italics).
Like wine, steak in France is an ‘élément de base, nationalisé 
plus encore que socialisé’ (p. 78). The extent to which steak is 
socialized is indicated by its omnipresence, in all its various 
avatars, in the lowliest of bistrots as in the most expensive of 
fashionable restaurants. But whilst one might plausibly argue 
that the consumption of raw steak is ‘natural’ or ‘life-enhanc­
ing’, other elements of the myth appear less motivated. Indeed, 
the most arbitrary features of the myth prove to be the most vir­
ulent. This is the level at which steak, like wine, is transformed 
into a patriotic emblem: ‘National, il suit la cote des valeurs 
patriotiques: il les renfloue en temps de guerre, il est la chair 
même du combattant français, le bien inaliénable qui ne peut 
passer à l’ennemi que par trahison’ (p. 79).
The potato chip basks in the reflected patriotic glory which 
accrues to steak. Paris Match (one of Barthes’s favourite sources 
of mythical data) reported that General de Castries, after the 
humiliation of Diên Biên Phu which saw France effectively boot­
ed out of Indo-China, had gone on record as requesting ‘des
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pommes de terre frites’ for his first meal ‘back in civilization’: 
in other words, the general proved as adroit in his sensitivity to, 
and manipulation of, cultural connotations, as Coty proved inept 
in his slip-up with the mineral water.
Steak and chips, like wine, are the ‘signe alimentaire de la 
“francité”’ (p. 79).
As can be seen, the innocence of the mythical object (the ob­
jective qualities of wine, for example) causes the mythologist a 
degree of embarrassment, and this embarrassment bears first and 
foremost on the question of methodology. The activity of deci­
phering myth can always be made to appear either excessively 
motivated or excessively arbitrary -  but excessive in either case. 
If the mythologist starts by exposing the mythical concept trans­
mitted by the object in question (‘francité’ in the case of wine; 
‘basquité’ in the case of the white chalet) he can be attacked on 
the grounds that his analysis is motivated purely and simply by 
ideological contestation. But a failure to pin down the ideolog­
ical dimension -  which is after all the motive which causes the 
myth to be proffered -  leaves the analyst hanging uncomfortably 
in the air: he has produced a joke without a punch-line. The 
longish theoretical essay, ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’, published as a 
postface to the volume, could be read as Barthes’s attempt to 
provide a firm base from which to combat these accusations of 
excess.
Writing in 1974, Barthes said of the model he had adopted in 
‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’: ‘il rassurait l’engagement intellectuel 
en lui donnant un instrument d’analyse’ (12, p. 11). Now is per­
haps the moment to take a look at this instrument of analysis.
ii) D éfin ir  d ’u n e  faço n  m é th o d iq u e  le  m y th e  c o n tem po r a in
Before proceeding a word of caution is in order. Although 
the positioning of ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’ invites us to use it as 
an interpretative grid by which to read the preceding essays, to 
do so would be to miss both the point of the essays and the im­
port of the postface: the essays can be read and understood per­
fectly well without the help of the postface; they stand on their
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own. The postface was written in the summer of 1956 and was 
according to one critic, intended to be ‘un texte addit i f  pour 
donner au recueil une unité, une direction’ (16, p. 155). Whilst it 
clearly does systematize many of the insights of the essays this 
retrospective, unifying glance should not be allowed to obscure 
those aspects of ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’ which were evidently 
prospective: Barthes later referred to it as his first semiological 
text, and it was to feed directly into the research which produced 
works such as Système de la mode and Eléments de sémiologie In 
the necessarily brief discussion that follows, it will not be possi­
ble, or even desirable, to attend to the minutiae of Barthes’s 
exposition. I shall concentrate only on the broad lines of the 
argument. Perhaps the most significant aspect of ‘Le mythe, au­
jourd’hui’ is the way it gestures towards a ‘scientific’ foundation. 
The fact that it falls some way short of achieving that ambition 
serves only to emphasize the importance of the gesture, in itself.
Barthes’s first step in ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’ is to insist on 
a methodological separation between the description of myth as 
form, and the analysis of myth as content: ‘[le mythe] est un 
mode de signification, c ’est une forme. II faudra plus tard poser 
à cette forme des limites historiques, des conditions d’emploi, 
réinvestir en elle la société: cela n’empêche pas qu’il faut 
d’abord la décrire comme forme’ (p. 193). Ironically enough, 
this attempt to bring the practice of ‘mythology’ under the 
umbrella of science is less notable for what it actually achieves, 
than for what it connotes: to espouse the procedures of linguistic 
‘science’ is to justify, to lend credibility to a practice which 
might otherwise appear arbitrary or excessive.
So myth, Barthes tells us, is ‘une parole’. Not the spoken 
word, nor even the written word, but ‘toute unité ou toute synthèse 
significative, qu’elle soit verbale ou visuelle: une photographie 
sera pour nous parole au même titre qu’un article de journal; les 
objets eux-mêmes pourront devenir parole, s’ils signifient quelque 
chose (p. 195). One might add to this list the exaggerated 
grimaces and protestations of agony of an all-in wrestler, a glass 
of wine or a plate of chips, or the then new Citroën DS 19.
Thus defined, the ‘parole mythique’ (and the ‘science’ which 
studies it) find their place within a much wider scientific pro-
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gramme: semiology. Semiology was the name, borrowed from 
medical terminology (‘the diagnosis of symptoms’), given by the 
Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure to a ‘science which studies 
the life of signs within society’ (31, p. 16). Saussure envisaged 
this future science as a part of social psychology, and further en­
visaged linguistics as a mere part of semiology. In later works 
Barthes was to invert this hierarchy, seeing semiology as a par­
ticular branch of linguistic science. By the time he came to write 
Système de la mode, for example, he doubted whether there is 
any system of objects that can dispense with articulated lan­
guage: ‘la parole n’est-elle pas le relais fatal de tout ordre signi
fiant?’ (5, p. 9). Or if such systems do exist (semaphore, the sys­
tem of traffic signals...) they tend to be singularly uninteresting. 
But this is leading us away from the matter at hand. Barthes con­
siders Saussure’s definition of the linguistic sign to be the essen­
tial postulate of any possible semiology (p. 197). Saussure’s 
schema is tripartite: the signifier (an acoustic or visual image) 
the signified (a concept), and the sign itself, which is the associa­
tive total of signifier and signified. This unvarying structure is 
useful for Barthes in that it provides a descriptive matrix imme­
diately applicable to any signifying medium: natural language, 
image, spectacle etc.
The diagram on p. 200 of Mythologies both clarifies and ob­
scures the use Barthes makes of this notion of the linguistic sign. 
What emerges clearly is that myth somehow grafts itself on to an 
already existing literal meaning: ‘[le mythe] s’édifie à partir d’une 
chaîne sémiologique qui existe avant lui: c 'est un système sémio
logique second’ (p. 199). The mythical signified appropriates, or 
takes over, an existing sign and uses it as its own signifier. In 
more concrete terms, ‘le départ du mythe est constitué par l’ar
rivée d’un sens’ (p. 208). The obscurity arises from the impreci­
sion of Barthes’s terminology. He calls the first-order sign the 
‘object-language’, and the second-order (mythical) system the 
‘metalanguage’. 2 In fact, the terms denotation and connotation,
2 Barthes later corrected ‘metalanguage’ to ‘connotation’, in line with the 
definitions of these terms provided by the Danish linguist Hjelmslev. See, for 
example, Eléments de sémiologie’ in L ’Aventure sémiologique, pp. 76-80.
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which I have already used without explanation, would have been 
both clearer and more accurate. Alternatively, ‘literal meaning’ 
and ‘rhetorical meaning’ would adequately describe these two 
interlocking levels of a system which presents itself as a flawless 
whole. Barthes’s very first book, Le Degré zéro de I ’écriture, 
had opened with an excellent example of this procedure: ‘Hébert 
ne commençait jamais un numéro du Père Duchêne sans y met
tre quelques “foutre” et quelques “bougre”. Ces grossièretés ne 
signifiaient rien, mais elles signalaient’ (7, p. 7). The terminol­
ogy is not yet that of structural linguistics, but the idea is already 
present: Hébert’s obscenities denote nothing (‘signifier’), but 
they are used for what they connote (‘signaler’).
A few more examples might perhaps serve to clarify this 
point. When I read in Elle (another mythological treasure-house) 
the following information regarding women novelists: ‘Jacque­
line Lenoir (deux filles, un roman); Marina Grey (un fils, un 
roman); Nicole Dutreil (deux fils, quatre romans)’ (p. 56) how 
am I intended to understand this? Quite simply, or literally, that 
Jacqueline Lenoir has written one novel and that she has two 
daughters. But I also receive a second message, composed of 
a whole bundle of connotations. The grammatical equivalence 
between children and books leads one to suppose that both are 
‘produits miraculeux d’une parthénogénèse idéale qui donnerait 
en une seule fois à la femme les joies balzaciennes de la création 
et les joies tendres de la maternité’ (p. 57). Indeed, this equation 
is long established in the Romantic myth of creativity. But there 
is more. This insistence on the child-bearing ‘essence’ of women 
serves above all to remind them that their status is properly 
defined only in relation to men. The world of Elle is the world 
of the harem: the women can roam at leisure within its walls, 
indulge themselves in their little fantasies, enjoy the illusion 
of freedom, but only after the door has been securely locked 
from the outside. Barthes descries an identical operation in the 
agony columns of women’s magazines (‘Celle qui voit clair’) and, 
in a significantly attenuated form, in horoscopes (‘Astrologie’).
The literal meaning in the above example is formed by a lin­
guistic message, a phrase, a series of phrases, but it could equal­
ly well be an image, like the electoral publicity photographs
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analysed in ‘Photogénie électorate’. Since one is entitled to ex­
pect an electoral candidate to have a more or less human appear­
ance, one may suppose that the literal meaning of such photo­
graphs is not of primary importance. The underlying message 
is quite disproportionate to the modest material which serves as 
its vehicle. It is vast, nebulous: ‘c’est une assiette sociale, le con
fort spectaculaire de normes familiales, juridiques, religieuses 
[. . .] bref ce qu’on appelle une idéologie’ (p. 161). This sec­
ondary meaning -  or myth -  can be communicated through obvi­
ous ‘props’ such as an army uniform (with decorations of 
course), an entourage of adoring and manifestly well-behaved 
children, and so on. But also through less obvious, if more inter­
esting, means such as the angle of the shot. In this latter respect, 
the ‘ascensional three-quarter shot’ is particularly favoured: ‘le 
visage est levé vers une lumière surnaturelle qui l’aspire, l’élève 
dans les regions d’une haute humanité, le candidat atteint à 
l’olympe des sentiments élevés, où toute contradiction politique 
est résolue . . . ’ (p. 162).
It is important to note that the connoted meaning does not 
simply abolish the first-order, denoted meaning, and this 
because it needs it. Or, more precisely, because it needs its 
unbesmirched innocence to serve as its alibi. This is made pos­
sible by the fact that the mythical signifier is a double-sided en­
tity; it is at one and the same time a fully constituted denoted 
meaning (sens), and the signifier (forme) of a mythical signi­
fied. In order to be a ‘perpetual alibi’, all that myth requires is 
that ‘son signifiant ait deux faces [. . .]: le sens est toujours là 
pour présenter la forme; la forme est toujours là pour distancer 
le sens’ (p. 209). In our earlier example, the undeniably factual 
information that Jacqueline Lenoir has written one novel and 
has two daughters serves as a cast-iron alibi for the more ten­
dentious meaning detected by Barthes. And he finds a striking 
image to describe this way in which myth worms its way into a 
first-order meaning, colonizing it from within: ‘[Le mythe] 
arrache aux sens dont il s’alimente une survie insidieuse, 
dégradée, il provoque en eux un sursis artificiel dans lequel 
il s' installe à l’aise, il en fait des cadavres parlants’ (p. 219). 
Invasion of the Body Snatchers!
The Life o f Signs
2 1
There is one final twist in this formal description of myth. 
The mythical concepts which constitute the connotative level 
(‘francité’, ‘basquité’, ‘ce qu’on appelle une idéologic’ etc.) are 
evidently cultural through and through: they are fashioned by 
History, they did not fall fully-formed from the heavens. But the 
essential function of myth is, precisely, to cause them to be read 
or consumed as if they were natural: as self-evident and devoid 
of human origin as a rock or a tree. One of the most sustained 
analyses of this ‘naturalisation’ is to be found in ‘Grammaire 
africaine’. Writing of the official government discourse on the 
colonial wars in North Africa, Barthes remarks: ‘Nous sommes 
ici au coeur même de la formation du mythe: c’est parce que la 
mission de la France, le déchirement du peuple marocain ou le 
destin de l’Algérie sont donnés grammaticalement comme des 
postulats (qualité qui leur est généralm ent conférée par l’emploi 
de l’article défini) que nous ne pouvons discursivement les con- 
tester (la mission de la France: mais, voyons, n’insistez pas, vous 
savez bien ..  .). La notoriété est la première forme de la naturali­
sation’ (p. 142). Such assertions are, in their own way, as unan­
swerable as the question ‘when did you stop beating your wife?’
This should enable us to grasp the nature of the mythologist’s 
struggle against the ‘innocence’ of the object: ‘C’est pour cela 
que le mythe est vécu comme une parole innocente: non parce 
que ses intentions sont cachées: si elles étaient cachées, elles ne 
pourraient être efficaces; mais parce qu’elles sont naturalisées’ 
(p. 217). Myth, then, transforms Culture into Nature, or better, 
into a kind of bastardized pseudo-nature.
There are a number of blind spots in ‘Le mythe, au- 
jourd’hui’. It is, for example, remarkable that myth is described 
as a semiological operation, its function is analysed, but it is 
nowhere defined substantially. In the passage where Barthes 
considers the question of the production and reception of myth 
(pp. 214-15), his analysis raises more questions than it answers. 
In Barthes’s account, the production of myth appears to be a 
highly conscious and intentional process. This may well be true 
in some cases, in the creation of the advertising myths, for exam­
ple, which are the object of several of the ‘mythologies’, and 
which Barthes was later to analyse in ‘Le Message publicitaire’
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(12, pp. 243-48); or in the fashion myths exhaustively analysed 
in Système de la mode, where a decision-group arbitrarily de­
cides on what is ‘in’ and what is ‘out’ each year. But the vast 
majority of myths cannot be ascribed to a single originator, or 
even to a restricted group. An analogous problem arises in con­
nection with reception (how the myth is ‘read’ or ‘received’ by 
the public). Barthes points out, correctly, that connotations will 
be read differently by different individuals and groups, depend­
ing on factors such as social class, education, political orienta­
tion, and so on. But the same could also be said of the literal 
meaning: denotation appears to benefit in Barthes’s analysis 
from a special dispensation -  it is a referential Utopia where 
words ‘speak the world’ directly. In fact, the denotative use of 
language is no less conventional, or cultural, than the mythical 
meanings which adhere to it. These points will all be re-exam­
ined in later chapters.
Despite the interesting lacunae in the theoretical apparatus, 
the fact remains that Barthes felt it necessary to provide a the­
oretical reflection on these essays written ‘au gré de l’actualité’. 
I have already suggested that this could lead us to see ‘Le mythe, 
aujourd’hui’ at one level at least, as a kind of justification. But 
for what? Critical opinion is by no means unanimous. Louis- 
Jean Calvet sees the postface as an attempt to ground the exist- 
ing (basically ideological) practice of the essays in linguistic the­
ory. The postface would therefore be ‘un pont dialectique entre 
deux pratiques, celle présente dans l’ouvrage et celle à venir . . . ’ 
(15, p. 53). Philippe Roger, on the other hand, is unimpressed by 
the ‘minces propositions théoriques’ of the postface, which he 
qualifies as an ‘improbable échafaudage’, designed to ‘protéger 
un élan d’écriture, une démarche d’écrivain’ (27, p. 92). It is 
worth noting that these two interpretations are not mutually ex­
clusive.
Having followed Barthes in his formal description of myth, it 
is now time for the ‘reinvestiture of society’. This means consid­
ering the uses to which myth is put in our western societies: 
myth as a kind of corporate venture, an ideological operation.
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‘A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing, 
and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in 
reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical 
subtleties and theological niceties.’
Karl Marx
i) LE MONDE COMMENCE LÀ OÙ LE SENS FINIT
A s  we saw in the last chapter, Barthes established a method­
ological distinction between semiology and ideology; that 
is to say, between the study of how mythological signs function, 
and the study of what those signs are telling us. He insists in ‘Le 
mythe, aujourd’hui’ that ' l ' idéologie a ses méthodes, la sémiolo
gie a les siennes’ (p. 224), and that it would be a mistake to con­
fuse them. Be this as it may, the critical practice represented by 
the essays themselves -  prior to any attempt at theorization-  
conjugates these two levels, and creates the impression that 
Barthes was, at least initially, rather more interested in laying 
bare the ‘abus idéologique’ perpetrated by myth, than in demon­
strating the formal devices which myth employed to this end.
At first sight, the connotations brought to light in the course 
of Mythologies might appear to be as heteroclite as the subjects 
of the essays themselves: the ‘francité’ embodied by a glass of 
wine, the ‘romanité’ residing in the plastered-down fringes of 
Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar, the ‘assiette sociale’ of the elec­
toral candidate, the divine right of the colonialist etc. But in real­
ity, all of these ‘fragments of ideology’ are subsumed under a 
single connoted system which is that of bourgeois ideology 
itself. The time has come, then, to focus on Barthes’s use of 
the notion of ideology in Mythologies. What is the nature of this 
ideology? What is the nature of the society which produces it? 
Why should myth be its preferred form of expression?
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Whilst the essays themselves, by their very diversity, tend 
to present a fragmented view of the way in which this society 
represents itself -  as if it were viewing itself in a mirror crack­
ed into a thousand segments -  Barthes’s theoretical reflections 
begin from a unified vision. This is because, precisely, the essays 
deal initially with manifest images, whereas the theoretical re­
flections go straight to the heart of the latent reality: beneath the 
surface of mutating political parties, succeeding governments, 
demographic change, urbanization, developing technology and 
so on, France remains fundamentally what it had been one 
hundred and fifty years before: 'le statut profond demeure, qui 
est celui d’un certain régime de propriété, d’un certain ordre, 
d’une certaine idéologie’ (pp. 224-25).
The notion of ideology has to be understood in the context 
of the Marxist philosophical tradition.3 The actual term only 
appears in Marx’s middle period: the works written around and 
about the 1848 revolutions in Europe. It refers to a distortion of 
thought which both stems from and conceals social contradic­
tions. This distortion takes the form, specifically, of an inverted 
consciousness of reality. For example, if one were to look at the 
rhetoric of nineteenth-century bourgeois liberalism, one would 
find it to be dominated by ‘buzz-words’ such as ‘freedom’ and 
‘equality’, but if one delved beneath this manifest level of dis­
course to the social realities of the period (how wealth was pro­
duced, by whom, for whom etc.), then, as Marx wrote in a later 
work, this apparent individual equality and liberty disappear 
and prove to be inequality and unfreedom’ (13, p. 220). One 
could say that ideology is society’s subjective representation of 
its objective position, and this representation is characterized by 
the way it inverts that ‘objective reality’: the world of ideology is 
the world turned upside down.
The frequent occurrence in Mythologies of terms such as 
‘image renversée’ and ‘renversement idéologique’ suggests that 
it is this classical Marxist definition that provides Barthes with
3 Concise definitions, as well as suggestions for further reading can be 
found in: Tom Bottomore (ed.), A Dictionary o f Marxist Thought, Blackwell, 1983.
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his reference point. The most fundamental inversion carried out 
by ideology is the one which turns Culture into Nature the his­
torical into the eternal. This is why Barthes claims that the pecu­
liar characteristic of bourgeois ideology is that it pretends not to 
be one: ‘la bourgeoisie se définit comme la classe sociale qui ne 
veut pas être nommée’ (p. 225). The bourgeoisie attempts to pass 
off its own class values (and interests) as something eternal and 
natural. . . and therefore unquestionable: there are no bourgeois 
or workers, there are only men, bom free and with equal stakes 
in an eternal ‘human nature’. Just as for Margaret Thatcher, that 
great champion of freedom and ‘choice’, there is no society, 
‘only individuals and their families’.
And this is where myth re-enters the picture. We saw in the 
last chapter that the function of myth (as a semiological system) 
is to impose cultural messages under a cover, or alibi, of natural­
ness: ‘fonder une intention historique en nature, une contingence 
en éternité’ (p. 229). This, of course, is precisely what ideology 
seeks to accomplish, and myth is therefore the perfect instrument 
for the job: ‘Si notre société est objectivement le champ pri­
vilégé  des significations mythiques, c’est parce que le mythe est 
formellement l 'instrument le mieux approprié au renversement 
idéologique qui la définit’ (pp. 229-30).
So what, in fact, distinguishes myth from ideology? 
Barthes’s failure to give a single precise definition of myth in 
‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’ makes this question more difficult than 
it might have been. The term is used in at least three slightly dif­
ferent ways in the essays and postface. First, it refers to the sec­
ondary system analysed in Chapter 1, and which could, in any 
case, be defined simply as ‘connotation’. Second, it refers to the 
mythical signified itself, to that which is connoted. Lastly, it 
refers to a general discursive strategy which embraces both 
denotation and connotation in a global inversion of reality. It is, 
then, a kind of machine which sucks in the world at one end, and 
spews it out at the other miraculously cleansed of conflict and 
contradiction. Its end product is ‘un monde sans contradictions 
parce que sans profondeur, un monde étalé dans l’évidence, [le 
mythe] fonde une clarté heureuse: les choses ont l 'air de signi
fier toutes seules’ (p. 231). Taken at the level of content, myth is
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virtually indistinguishable from ideology. At the purely formal 
level, the distinction appears better founded.
But some of the essays appear to be using a slightly differ­
ent, less theorized, notion of myth. Barthes uses the idea of a 
‘poetic myth’, derived perhaps from phenomenological criticism, 
in several of the essays -  one thinks, for example, of ‘Nautilus et 
Bateau ivre’ or ‘Paris n’a pas été inondé’. In these essays, the 
ideological ‘punch-line’ is not particularly self-evident. In an­
other essay, ‘Saponides et détergents’, the rather abrasive, not to 
say detergent, final reminder that Persil and Omo are both pro­
duced by the sinister ‘trust anglo-hollandais Unilever' (p. 40), 
somehow fails to break the spell woven by Barthes’s elegant 
analysis of the poetic resources marshalled by the advertise­
ments for these products. Further to this, Louis-Jean Calvet has 
pointed out that earlier essays such as ‘Le monde où l’on 
catche’, ‘L’écrivain en vacances’ and ‘Les Romains au cinéma’ 
use a notion of myth which is closer to the Greek mythological 
sense: a legend which explains and interprets man’s place in the 
world. Indeed, Calvet calls this version of myth ‘mythe-légende’, 
and remarks that it progressively mutates into ‘mythe
mensonge’ -  with all its Marxist connotations of mystification 
(15, pp. 39-52). By the final essay in the volume, ‘Poujade et les 
intellectuels’, Barthes is practising a form of full-blown ideolog­
ical discourse analysis.
In general, one could say that Barthes’s ideological vision of 
myth becomes increasingly Marxist as his target becomes clearer 
to him.
ii) LA d épe r d itio n  d e  la  q u a lité  h isto r iq u e  d es  c h o ses
So once again it can be seen that the postface adds nothing 
new to the practice which it theorizes. If anything, it introduces 
an interesting element of confusion into the proceedings. We can 
gain an idea of Barthes’s demythifying intentions, at least as 
clear as that furnished by the postface, by looking at some of the 
essays themselves.
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One of the main reasons why Vichy France was so eager to 
collaborate actively with the Nazis was its desire to protect its 
overseas colonies from annexation by the allies especially 
Britain. It need not have bothered. From the end of the war, 
France was embroiled in a series of savage colonial wars in Indo­
china, Madagascar (the arena of a particularly bloody struggle) 
and North Africa. Morocco, Tunisia, and, most notoriously, 
Algeria. Many of these struggles were coming to a head at the 
period in which Mythologies was written, and they form an insis­
tent backdrop to a number of the essays. ‘Grammaire africaine’ 
is one such essay. In setting out to analyse the ‘vocabulaire offi
ciel des affaires africaines’ (p. 137), Barthes uses a parodic dic­
tionary form which is rather reminiscent of Flaubert’s ‘Diction
naire des idées reçues’. He remarks that the official discourse is 
a kind of coded language, the function of which is to ‘donner à 
un réel cynique la caution d’une morale noble’ (p. 137). Its prin­
cipal device is the inversion of reality. When the term ‘déchire
ment’ (normally qualified by ‘cruel’ or ‘douloureux’) is wheeled 
out, it imposes the image of an abstract tragedy, a vague fatality, 
in order to conceal the historical reality of the conflict. Similarly, 
the ‘destinies’ of the French and Algerian people are presented 
as being mysteriously -  or even mystically -  wedded: if the 
French have a colonial presence in North Africa it is because 
they are simply fulfilling the terms of the ‘mission’ entrusted to 
them, as the term implies, by God. But God, as Barthes lacon­
ically points out, is merely the ‘Forme sublimée du gouvernement 
français’ (p. 139).
It is not difficult to see how these ‘myths’ operate a ‘ren- 
versement idéologique’: if the reality of the situation is one of 
economic exploitation and political oppression, the mythical 
image either magics this away completely (the verb ‘escamoter’ 
is repeatedly used by Barthes to describe this sleight of hand), 
or presents it as being in the order of things: all part of some 
obscure divine plan, the details of which have apparently been 
vouchsafed only to selected members of the French government.
Pertinent as these remarks may be, they are not particularly 
surprising. Indeed, it would be surprising if official discourse did 
not have a more or less perceptible ideological bias. It is a ques­-
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tion of context: we are accustomed to viewing government min­
isters as purveyors of half-truths and lies -  these are, after all, 
their stock-in-trade -  so our critical senses are alerted from the 
outset. This point does not escape Barthes, who closes the essay 
by remarking on the growing desperation of the ideologues: 
they are continually obliged to reinforce their ‘substantive 
myths’ -  which are fooling fewer and fewer people -  by the addi­
tion of redundant adjectives. For once, myth is on the run, and it 
is almost triumphantly that he concludes, ‘La rhétorique offi
cielle a beau entasser les couvertures de la réalité, il y a un mo­
ment où les mots lui résistent et l’obligent à révéler sous le 
mythe l’alternative du mensonge ou de la vérité: l’indépendance 
est ou n’est pas, et tous les dessins adjectifs qui s’efforcent de 
donner au néant les qualités de l’être sont la signature même de 
la culpabilité’ (pp. 143-44).
If all the essays in Mythologies dealt with official discourse, 
the book would make tedious and repetitious reading. But herein 
lie the interest and originality of Barthes’s undertaking: the point 
is not only that ideology reproduces itself in the most unexpected 
of places, but also that it is at its most potent when expressed 
through a medium and in a context where we would least expect 
to encounter it. The most ‘innocent’ of objects can often be the 
most maleficent. Take a child’s toy, for example, or the latest 
model of Citroën. Or that interesting, gossipy little piece we 
might read whilst waiting for the barber to turn our top-knot into 
a forest of signs.
Today’s popular press has an unquenchable thirst for stories 
about royalty. The Queen’s corgis or Prince Charles’s latest 
mishap on the ski slopes are always good for filling a page or 
two. This is not a recent trend, as ‘La croisière du Sang bleu’ 
proves. A hundred or so princes and princesses, kings and con­
sorts, had embarked on a cruise on a kind of floating royal stud 
farm, the Agamemnon, where, as Barthes remarks, any issue of 
discreet maritime couplings could at least be guaranteed to be 
bom with blue blood (p. 35). But how did they occupy their 
time? Well, they were clearly ‘roughing it’: kings had actually 
dispensed with their flunkeys and had even stooped so low as to 
shave themselves in the morning; King Paul had disguised him­-
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self in a short-sleeved shirt, and Queen Frederica had been seen 
sporting a printed fabric dress of the kind ordinary mortals 
might wear. The fact that this was considered both singular and 
amusing is instructive: ‘Afficher que les rois sont capables de 
prosaïsme [. . .], c’est constater que le roi est encore de droit 
divin’ (p. 34). These newspaper articles use a kind of anti- 
phrasis -  or inversion -  in order to promote a very old myth: the 
divine right of royalty. If we are expected to find the spectacle of 
a king assuming the habits and attire of mortal men somehow 
strange, it can only be because we are also expected to regard 
their divine status as natural
In this essay, the two conceptions of myth mentioned above 
(‘mythe-légende’ and ‘mythe-mensonge’) actually overlap. The 
Olympian myth is foregrounded (by its apparent contradiction: 
kings are just ordinary chaps after all) all the better to hide the 
deeper mystification which Barthes brings to light at the very 
end: ‘tout ce baratin anecdotique, dont la grande presse a saoulé 
ses lecteurs, n ’est pas donné impuném ent. . .’ The deepest level 
of dissimulation concerns the political . . . ‘le comte de Paris 
abandonne l'Agamemnon pour venir à Paris “surveiller” le sort 
de la C.E.D., et l 'on envoie le jeune Juan d’Espagne au secours 
du fascisme espagnoT (p. 35).
Both ‘Grammaire africaine’ and ‘La croisière du Sang bleu’ 
serve to illustrate Barthes’s dictum that ‘le mythe est une parole 
dépolitisée’ (p. 230). But it should be noted that Barthes means 
something quite specific by ‘le politique’; it refers to the deepest 
(and most hidden) level of social reality: the relations of produc­
tion, and resulting power structures, which form the base of any 
given society. This notion of ‘le politique’ (as opposed to ‘la 
politique’) is further explored in other essays, dealing this time 
not with discourse but with actual objects.
‘Jouets’, for instance, analyses the ideological investment in 
children’s toys. Toys are never trivial, they condition children 
into an unquestioning acceptance of a ready-made world, and 
prefigure the place which awaits them in that world. More 
specifically, they prepare the child for his role as a consumer. 
‘l'enfant ne peut se constituer qu’en propriétaire, en usager, 
jamais en créateur’ (p. 59). When a child plays with a model car,
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a miniature post-office or a toy soldier, he is conditioned into 
accepting them as aspects of some kind of natural reality. And 
when a little girl is given a doll whose nappy she is expected to 
change, she is hardly likely to infer from this that a future as an 
engineer or a lorry driver awaits her! No one is denying the exis­
tence in reality of post-offices, soldiers or housewives: Barthes’s 
point concerns the kind of existence the child is led to ascribe to 
them. The child will most likely regard the existence of soldiers 
and tanks (and by extension war itself) as being as natural as 
trees, rivers and lakes: ‘Que les jouets français préfigurent lit- 
téralement l’univers des fonctions adultes ne peut évidemment 
que préparer l 'enfant à les accepter toutes, en lui constituant 
avant même qu’il réfléchisse l’alibi d’une nature qui a créé de 
tout temps des soldats, des postiers et des vespas’ (p. 59). In 
Barthes’s vision, the process of mystification which culminates 
in the presentation of colonial war as some kind of natural catas­
trophe, begins in the ‘innocent’ games of childhood.
Another central theme of Mythologies, and which appears in 
‘Jouets’, is the split between production and consumption, or 
rather the difference in consciousness between producer and 
consumer.
Barthes was later to write in Système de la mode: ‘Calcula- 
trice, la société industrielle est condamnée à former des consom- 
mateurs qui ne calculent pas; si producteurs et acheteurs du 
vêtement avaient une conscience identique, le vêtement ne 
s’achèterait (et ne se produirait) qu’au gré, fort lent, de son 
usure’ (5, p. 9). These comments on the fashion industry could 
be extended to the rules governing the process of exchange of 
all commodities in the consumer society. The notional child of 
‘Jouets’ who is unwittingly indoctrinated ‘avant même qu’il 
réfléchisse’ is, perhaps, the prototype of all ‘receivers’ of 
ideological messages in the world of Mythologies. The eager, 
admiring crowds who flock to the Motor Show where the latest 
Citroën is on show are, in this respect, children too.
In ‘La nouvelle Citroën’, Barthes demonstrates how con­
sciousness becomes distorted through its fascination with a 
‘magical object’. He likens the new car to a modem equivalent 
of the Gothic cathedral, in that it is ‘consommée dans son image,
sinon dans son usage, par un peuple entier qui s’approprie en 
elle un objet parfaitement magique’ (p. 150, my italics). It is both 
perfect and seemingly devoid of origin. The bodywork panels 
appear to fit together by simple juxtaposition: there are no 
visible rivets or welded joints which would betray the labour that 
went into producing it. It is the very embodiment of that essen
tialist ideology in which ‘les choses [. . .] perdent le souvenir de 
leur fabrication’ (p. 230). The manner in which the car is mar­
keted, or promoted, quite apart from its design features, also con­
tributes to the creation of this mythical object which everyone 
can consume, either in reality (by purchasing it), or in imagina­
tion (by admiring the image), but which nobody appears to have 
produced. This idea of the disparity between the consciousness 
of the producer and that of the consumer is another theme which 
Marx developed in, for example, his notion of ‘commodity 
fetishism’, or in the distinction he made between use-value and 
exchange-value (see 13, pp. 86-87). But the broad theme is 
present in nearly all of Barthes’s works, both before and after 
Mythologies, and it could equally well have had its origin in a 
reflection not on consumer durables, but on books. The idea is 
present in Le Degré zéro de I’écriture, in the opposition between 
a classical literature of pure consumption and the utopian vision 
of a literature of production. Barthes did not need to go directly 
back to Marx to discover this idea. In Qu’est-ce que la littéra
ture?, Sartre too had explored the opposition between a literature 
of consumption and a literature of production (30, p. 288); he 
too talks of the bourgeoisie as a class which cloaks itself in 
anonymity (30, p. 142), and of ‘exoticism’ as an ideological alibi 
(30, p. 236), and of the necessity to pit dialectical thought 
against the ravages of bourgeois analytic reason (30, p. 146) -  a 
clarion call echoed in many of the ‘mythologies’, but most mem­
orably in ‘L’usager de la grève’ and ‘Quelques paroles de M. 
Poujade’. This is not to impugn the originality of Barthes’s 
thought in Mythologies: it simply serves to indicate the extent to 
which Marxist -  not to mention linguistic and psychoan­
alytic -  notions were all part of the intellectual baggage of intel­
lectuals writing at this period.
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One commentator has likened the cumulative effect of the 
‘mythologies’ -  the way a ‘system’ emerges from an analysis 
of disparate-seeming elements -  to the work of an unwitting 
bricklayer: ‘à force d’accumuler des briques, on finit parfois par 
faire un mur’ (15, p. 49). To pursue the analog, ‘Le mythe, 
aujourd’hui’ could be likened to the theoretical cement required 
to hold these elements together. Except that, as we will now see, 
there are cracks in this edifice. These could be plastered over, 
but Mythologies is a more interesting book when they are laid 
bare and explored.
iii) C et  ‘e n n e m i’ u n  peu  m y th iq u e
The question of ideology and consciousness is as good a 
place to start as any: how conscious of their own operations are 
the propagators of ideology ('les producteurs de mythes’)? What 
degree of awareness should we ascribe to their victims? In short, 
who is fooling whom?
One critic pointed out that Barthes ‘had, after all, ascribed 
the most alienating features of modem mass communications to 
a nefarious but ill-defined conspiracy entitled the bourgeoisie 
and had never paid his readers the compliment of saying who the 
bourgeoisie actually were, where they got their money from, and 
where the supposed plethora of idées reçues was actually to be 
found’ (33, p. 50). Whilst the suggestion that Barthes should 
have supplied the names and addresses of the conspirators is 
irresistibly ludicrous, Thody nevertheless does have half a point. 
The fact is that on occasion Barthes does talk of the myths he is 
dismantling as if they were the highly conscious fabrications of 
some secretive corporation bent on world domination (‘société 
anonyme’ in the commercial sense). The problem is highlighted 
by the vacillating distinction he draws between the bourgeoisie 
and the petite bourgeoisie, and their supposedly different ideol­
ogies.
The term ‘bourgeois’ can be used to refer to the middle 
classes in their entirety (as distinct from proletariat or aristocracy), 
but Barthes also uses the term to designate specifically the
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(grande) bourgeoisie who seized power in the nineteenth century 
through their ownership of the means of production, as opposed 
to the (petite) bourgeoisie who merely kept the machine oiled 
and ticking over, feeding off the crumbs that dropped from the 
real masters’ table. The latter are seen to be the victims of the 
former: ‘La bourgeoisie ne cesse d’absorber dans son idéologie 
toute une humanité qui n’a point son statut profond, et qui ne 
peut le vivre que dans l’imaginaire’ (p. 228). The upper middle 
class convinces the lower middle class that they have a commu­
nity of fundamental interests, but this is a cunning illusion. If the 
political alliance between bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie has 
held more or less solid for over a century, it is based on a case of 
mistaken identity, as it were. And Barthes’s commentary on his 
own essay ‘Conjugales’ confirms this vision of a dominant bour­
geois ideology which works by surreptitiously erasing real class 
distinctions: ‘c’est à partir du moment où une dactylo à vingt-
cinq mille francs par mois se reconnaît dans le grand mariage 
bourgeois que l’ex-nomination bourgeoise atteint son plein effet’ 
(pp. 228-29). This ‘dactylo à vingt-cinq mille francs par mois’ is 
also the notional mystified receiver of myth in essays such as 
‘Celle qui voit clair’ and ‘Astrologie’. The ideological operation 
involved in horoscopes, for example, consists in assuring the 
quietism of this ‘employée’ and her respect for the established 
order: ‘Les astres ne postulent jamais un renversement de 
l’ordre, ils influencent à la petite semaine, respectueux du statut 
social et des horaires patronaux’ (p. 166). This is a reproduction, 
in microcosm, of the uneasy ‘alliance’ between bourgeois and 
petits bourgeois: the former need to maintain, for electoral 
purposes, the stability of what is, historically and to this day, a 
highly volatile class.
So far so good. The model appears clear. We have our vic­
tims, and we have our perpetrators: ‘En répandant ses represen­
tations à travers tout un catalogue d’images collectives à usage 
petit-bourgeois, la bourgeoisie consacre l’indifférenciation illu- 
soire des classes sociales’ (p. 228). It is a conspiracy, or is it? For 
the above assertion surely overstates the awareness of those held 
responsible for the creation of myth, as much as it understates 
the awareness of those who consume it, who fall victim to it. It
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must be said that Marx himself appears rather vague as to the 
alternatives: are all men the unwitting mouthpieces of an ideol­
ogy which ‘speaks itself’ through them, which transcends their 
awareness of it? Or are ideological representations weapons, 
wielded consciously in the class struggle? The following com­
ment on bourgeois economic theories in The German Ideology 
tails off into eloquent equivocation: ‘production, as distinct from 
distribution etc., is to be presented as governed by eternal laws 
which are independent of history, and at the same time bourgeois 
relations are clandestinely passed off as irrefutable natural laws 
of society in abstracto. This is the more or less conscious pur­
pose of the whole procedure’ (22, p. 127).
It could be that a further complicating factor in Mythologies 
is introduced by the semiological model which Barthes adopts to 
describe ideological operations. The model which is used to 
demonstrate how myth is produced and consumed derives from 
communication theory. The idea that myth is a message presup­
poses a sender and a receiver. The sender is the producer of 
myths, and the message he sends is tailored (‘approprié’) to a 
particular receiver, or ‘consommateur de mythes’ (p. 204). This 
model may just work for limited cases -  such as advertisements, 
fashion edicts, or government communiqués -  but it does not 
seem sensitive enough to account for the dissemination of ideol­
ogy on the global scale which Barthes is envisaging in Mythol­
ogies. One obvious objection could be formulated thus: if myth 
is a message, then it must be transmitted in a code known to both 
sender and receiver. But it is unclear from Barthes’s model 
whether myth is deciphered, read, or just received (see 20, p. 
106). There must surely be degrees of blindness and insight at 
both ends of the process: the producer/consumer split which I 
analysed above is also operative here, and it produces in this case 
a rather oversimplified image of rascals and dupes.
But this image is just one side of the coin. In fact, Barthes is 
a very long way from presenting the petits bourgeois as the inno­
cent victims of the devilish machinations of their social superi­
ors. The 1957 preface to Mythologies talked only in terms of a 
‘sémiologie générale de notre monde bourgeois’ (p. 10, my ital­
ics), whereas the 1970 preface sees the enemy in more defined
terms: ‘la mystification qui transforme la culture petite-bour- 
geoise en nature universelle’ (p. 7, my italics). The erstwhile 
victims seem to have been promoted to the status of perpetrators. 
In fact, this progressive narrowing of the aim can be seen at work 
even within Mythologies, which culminates in a savage assault 
on that doyen of petit bourgeois ideologues, Pierre Poujade. 
Whilst admitting in his postface that there can be no fundamen­
tal differences between bourgeois and petit bourgeois ideologies, 
since, ‘quel que soit le public qui le consomme, le mythe postule 
l’immobilité de la Nature’ (p. 237), Barthes nevertheless identi­
fies certain mythological ‘figures’ such as ‘L’identification’, ‘La 
tautologie’ and ‘La quantification de la qualité’ (pp. 238-42) as 
being specifically petit bourgeois. It should also be noted that his 
comments on ‘Conjugales’ (see above p. 33), which tended to 
see the petits bourgeois as victims of the trickle-down effect of 
bourgeois values, are not reflected by the conclusion of that 
essay where, it seems, ‘la petite-bourgeoisie française [est] mani
festement aujourd’hui dans une phase d’impérialisme mythique’ 
(p. 50). Furthermore, in several of the essays he is at pains to 
point out the complicity of the petit bourgeois consumers of 
myth in their own mystification, most memorably in ‘L’opération 
Astra’: ‘Qu’importe, après tout, que l’ordre soit un peu brutal ou 
un peu aveugle, s’il nous permet de vivre à bon marché? Nous 
voilà, nous aussi, débarrassés d’un préjugé qui nous coûtait cher, 
trop cher, qui nous coûtait trop de scrupules, trop de révoltes, 
trop de combats et trop de solitude’ (p. 46). And ‘L’acteur d’Har
court’ presents us with a glimpse of Barthes’s bête noire: that 
public which is, ‘à la fois blasé et vivant de mensonge’ (p. 26). 
So lie there may be, but a strange kind of lie. Barthes was later 
to refer to connotation (myth) as ‘cette sorte de “mauvaise foi” 
formelle’ (5, p. 283), and this Sartrean concept of bad faith also 
informs his conception of myth and its reception in Mythologies. 
It is probably the ethical overtones of Sartre’s notion that attract­
ed Barthes: it implies not only self-delusion, but the complicity 
of the individual in this state of affairs. Indeed, Sartre had long 
identified bad faith as the habitual modus vivendi of a whole 
class: the bourgeoisie. And his famous distinction between 
salauds and lâches (29, pp. 84-85) seems to have been adapted
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by Barthes to characterize the relations between bourgeois and 
petit bourgeois: the petits bourgeois may well be (partially) mys­
tified, but they have conspired in their own mystification. In 
short, Barthes is not letting them off the hook; there are no atten­
uating circumstances.
Barthes’s hostility towards the petite bourgeoisie in Mythol­
ogies is manifest from even the most cursory reading, but this 
hostility has an intensity quite disproportionate to the theoretical 
justification provided by ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’. It may be use­
ful to ask oneself why.
There are a number of possible explanations, some more 
plausible than others. The least attractive one would see Barthes 
as a kind of intellectual snob. He distinguishes 'la culture bour- 
geoise proprement dite’ from ‘ses formes étendues, vulgarisées, 
utilisées’ (p. 227), the latter being further characterized as ‘des 
vérités bourgeoises dégradées, appauvries, commercialisées . . .’ 
(p. 228). All of these adjectives imply a loss of quality; as if the 
‘original’ bourgeois ideology was a mystification, true, but at 
least it was a mystification of substance!
A second reason for this unwonted savagery could be found 
in a characteristic which Barthes identifies uniquely with the 
ideology of the petite bourgeoisie: its anti-intellectualism. When 
Poujade evokes the degeneracy of the ‘grosses têtes’ and ‘tech­
nocrates apatrides’ by means of the rather unpleasant dictum, 
le poisson pourrit par la tête’, it is hardly surprising that 
Barthes — a notable ‘grosse tête’ himself — should feel stung into 
returning the compliment.
This mention of Poujade leads us into perhaps the most 
compelling explanation of Barthes’s virulent critique of petit- 
bourgeois ‘thought’ in Mythologies: the political context of the 
period in which the essays were being written. In the postface, 
Barthes comments that 'la petite-bourgeoisie n ’est pas libérale 
(elle produit le fascisme, alors que la bourgeoisie l’utilise): elle 
fait en retard l 'itinéraire bourgeois’ (p. 240). Fascism had not 
been killed off by the war, only rendered dormant, and the petite 
bourgeoisie was the class most likely to resurrect it. In 1953, 
Pierre Poujade, a bookseller/stationer, had founded the UDCA 
(l 'Union de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans de France),
and was elected to parliament, along with fifty-three other 
Poujadist deputies,4 in January 1956. Basically, the movement 
expressed the anxieties of small businessmen in the face of 
a changing economic and political situation: an accelerating 
process of decolonization abroad, and the rapid development of 
corporate capitalism at home.
In some respects, Poujadism was a throwback to the 1880s 
and to Paul Déroulède’s Ligue des patriotes with its unpleasant 
mix of ultra-patriotism, xenophobia, envy, racism and anti-intel- 
lectualism. Then too the petite bourgeoisie had felt itself 
squeezed between Capital and Labour: when confronted by the 
contradictions in his objective position, the ‘little man’ of fin  
de siècle France had thrashed around, blindly searching for 
panaceas, and had finished by creating a monster that can only 
be described as proto-fascism.
If one adds to the resistible rise of Pierre Poujade, the fact 
that the men of Vichy -  rehabilitated with unseemly haste -  were 
beginning to crawl out of the woodwork and worm their way into 
government, then the reasons for Barthes’s targeting of the petite 
bourgeoisie in Mythologies start to become clearer. Of course, 
one could also argue that the most striking thing about all of this 
is the element of repetition: Poujade is Déroulède repeated as 
farce; and Barthes was later to confirm that repetition itself had 
always been a ‘thème maléfique’ in his work (10, p. 218).
The situation on the other side of the Atlantic could not have 
appeared very much rosier: McCarthyism was in full swing and 
its patented representatives were abroad. In ‘Billy Graham au 
Vél d’Hiv’ Barthes likens the evangelical preacher to a music 
hall magician and warns, anxiously, that his petit bourgeois audi­
ence with its evident susceptibility to ‘des formes de pensée 
alogiques et hypnotiques’ is in a ‘situation d’aventure’ (p. 101). 
Although the word ‘fascism’ is not pronounced in that essay, the 
implicit intertext (Thomas Mann’s parable of Fascism, Mario 
and the Magician) leaves readers to draw their own conclusion.
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What, then, can we conclude about the relationship between 
myth and ideology in Mythologies? It would appear that many of 
the problems encountered in trying to gain a clear theoretical pic­
ture derive from the heterogeneity of Barthes’s influences. The 
decidedly idiosyncratic Marxisms of Sartre and Brecht are as 
‘useful’ to him as is Marx himself. Barthes’s attitude towards 
constituted theoretical thought in Mythologies -  and elsewhere -  
could be described as cavalier, in the best sense of the word: he 
picks up concepts, uses them, and drops them when they have 
overstayed their welcome. John Sturrock thought Barthes was 
writing from a ‘near-Marxist point of view’ in Mythologies (32, 
p. 91), but how ‘near’? And does it really matter? It strikes me 
that Marxist thought is more often connoted in Barthes’s dis­
course than faithfully used. This issue will be taken up again in 
Chapter 4, where I consider the question of tactics and strategies. 
Another problem best left till later concerns the presence -  or 
rather the absence -  of the proletariat, or working-class, in 
Mythologies. Where are they? Nowhere, or, rather, elsewhere: in 
a utopia which Barthes appears to have hankered after, in the 
company of other bourgeois intellectuals of the period, not least 
Sartre.
Barthes’s conception of the bourgeoisie has been described 
by Calvet as ‘un fourre-tout commode’ (16, p. 121). And we 
have seen that his notion of ideology is a no less handy and volu­
minous hold-all. Therein, perhaps, lie both its weaknesses and its 
strengths.
If Barthes’s theoretical bag of tricks is capable of carrying 
objects as disparate as children’s toys and a Citroën DS19, a 
monk’s hairstyle and the ravings of a politician, it is also capable 
of enveloping whole institutions. And it is to one of these that I 
will now turn: Literature.
Literature and Myth
3
i) L a  L ittératu re  v ie n t  d e  c o n d a m n er  u n  h o m m e  
À l’é chafaud
A b o u t  a quarter of the essays in Mythologies are directly or 
indirectly concerned with literary topics, but this statistic 
belies the central importance to Barthes’s project in Mythologies 
of a certain reflection on literature. Broadly literary subjects, 
such as those explored in essays like ‘Adamov et le langage’,  ‘La 
critique Ni-Ni’ or ‘L’art vocal bourgeois’ could be said to have a 
special status which sets them apart from the other subjects 
-  like striptease or Abbé Pierre’s hairstyle -  which constitute the 
bulk of this heteroclite collection. They are in fact refinements 
and continuations of a critique of the institution of Literature 
which Barthes had embarked upon before Mythologies, and 
which provided him with a way of thinking about other cultural 
institutions. The realization that ‘Literature, which uses the ob­
jects and events of the world as signifiers to speak its own mean­
ings, is technically speaking a connotation, a myth’ (20, p. 120) 
provides Barthes with the means of extending his critique of the 
literary discourse to other discourses (‘paroles’), most notably 
those spawned by modern mass culture.
In Le Degré zéro de l'écriture, Barthes had refined Sartre’s 
analysis of the novelistic discourse by identifying within it three 
elements: Langue, Style and Ecriture. The first refers to the actu­
al structures of the language in which the novelist writes. Inas­
much as the grammar and syntax of a language constitute the 
parameters which ultimately determine all possible utterances in 
that language, ‘langue’ is experienced as a limit. Style, on the 
other hand, is a necessity; it refers to those aspects of a writer’s 
language which are absolutely personal, obeying a visceral, cor­
poreal necessity. Barthes’s Michelet was a stylistic analysis in
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this sense of the word. In between this limit and this necessity 
comes ‘writing’. It is through his choice of writing that a writer 
declares his commitment to society. We have already encoun­
tered one example of what Barthes means by ‘writing’, in the 
case of Hébert and the sprinkling of ‘foutre’ and ‘bougre’ with 
which he habitually began his editorials: ‘writing’ is a form 
whose significance lies in what it connotes rather than what it 
denotes. In truth, Barthes does not analyse the phenomenon 
extensively in Le Degré zéro; he concentrates primarily on two 
narrative devices: the third person singular and the preterite. 
The former is nothing more, says Barthes, than the conventional 
sign of a pact between author and reader, it is the formal manifes­
tation of the myth of Literature; whereas the preterite, or past 
historic, has the paradoxical function of abolishing time: it 
compresses the ‘multiplicité des temps vécus et superposés’ (1, 
p. 25) into a single pinpoint, never to be repeated. Where lived 
reality is chaotic and multilayered, the preterite imposes, and 
signifies, an order, a hierarchy of events. It is, says Barthes, ‘le 
temps factice des cosmogonies, des mythes, des Histoires et des 
Romans’ (1, p. 26). Both devices tend towards a presentation of 
the world which, literally, leaves nothing to be desired. In terms 
more akin to those employed in Mythologies, one could say that 
these devices attempt to serve up the world like pre-packaged 
goods in a supermarket freezer, whereas in reality the world 
better resembles the vibrant anarchy of a flea-market: ‘jeté, 
étalé, offert’ (7, p. 26). As may now be clear, ‘writing’ and ‘myth’ 
are formally synonymous.
The ‘classical’ or ‘traditional’ novel whose writing is ana­
lysed in Le Degré zéro is therefore a literature of consumption. 
If one felt like taking this term literally, one could say (mais je 
sens des foudres à l’horizon . . .) that the difference between 
reading a Balzacian novel, and reading a ‘modem’ novel of the 
type promoted by Barthes, is comparable to the difference be­
tween eating a T.V dinner, and eating sukiyaki: a dish in which 
the difference between ‘le temps de sa fabrication et celui de sa 
consommation’ (6, p. 33) is abolished.
It will have been noted that Barthes indulges his fondness for 
capitalization (‘Romans’) in one of the above quotations. This is
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intended to signal a particular kind of novel, the ‘bourgeois 
novel’ of the French nineteenth century. It is no accident, for 
Barthes, that the development of this particular novelistic form 
coincided with the rise of the bourgeoisie. He argues in Le Degré 
zéro that the forms known as Récit, Histoire and Roman express 
a specific historical moment: the novel is a vehicle for ‘une cer- 
taine mythologie de l’universel, propre à la société bourgeoise, 
dont le Roman est un produit caractérisé’ (1, p. 28). The ideol­
ogy invested in the everyday myths of modem life is present also 
in the writing of the novel. This is hardly surprising if one 
accepts Barthes’s basic premise, namely that the socio-economic 
base of Balzac’s France has survived fundamentally unchanged 
into the France of the 1950s.
It is now time to look more closely at the various myths 
which come to light in Barthes’s literary mythologies. The essay 
on ‘La Littérature selon Minou Drouet’ is a veritable compen­
dium of bourgeois myths of literature. Minou Drouet was a child 
poet, the authenticity of whose works was vigorously contested. 
Barthes’s essay is contemporaneous with the lively debate sur­
rounding her second opus, Du brouillard dans les yeux (1956). 
The bourgeois press mounted a virtual inquisition into her 
‘case’, wheeling out ‘expert witnesses’ in the form of cashiered 
but eminent poets -  like the superannuated generals who materi­
alize on television whenever a war breaks out -  in order to ascer­
tain whether Drouet was a genuine child prodigy or a fake. 
These extraordinary measures set Barthes to wondering precisely 
what investment was being protected in this notion of the ‘child 
poet’. In fact, the stakes could not have been higher. The myth­
ical figures of ‘genius’, ‘child’ and ‘poet’ are all sublimated fig­
ures of ‘le mythe central de l’art bourgeois: celui de l’irrespon
sabilité’ (p. 153). A small digression is necessary at this point. 
As may have emerged from my brief foray into Le Degré zéro, 
the whole of Barthes’s thought on literature at this period is 
directed towards countering this myth, through his insistence on 
the ‘responsabilité de la forme’. Sartre had exhorted writers to a 
conscious commitment; Barthes had argued that, consciously or 
not, ‘writing’ was always an act of historical solidarity: ‘Comme
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Liberté, l’écriture n’est done qu’un moment. Mais ce moment 
est l 'un des plus explicites de l’Histoire, puisque l’Histoire, c’est 
toujours et avant tout un choix et les limites de ce choix’ (1, p. 
16). We will see shortly the reasons why bourgeois society is so 
eager to deny the inescapable responsibility of the artist. But 
first we will see how.
One such operation is described in ‘L’écrivain en vacances’. 
An illustrated article in Le Figaro had revealed to its readers the 
astonishing fact that writers go on holiday too. Like the aristo­
crats in the ‘Croisière du Sang bleu’, these awesome demiurges 
were just like you or me, really. But no! Even when floating 
down the Congo on a raft, or indulging his taste for ‘les jolies 
filles, le reblochon et le miel de lavande’ (p. 33), the writer kept 
his notebook ready to hand, lest he be ‘caught short’ by an im­
portunate attack of logorrhoea. All of this simply reaffirms the 
irresponsibility of the creator. The writer is merely a mouth­
piece, the plaything of some divine inspiration, the base form in 
which the sublime occasionally condescends to manifest itself. 
And when the operation is complete the writer is even more 
firmly ensconced in his Olympus, and no more accountable for 
his creation than is God for his!5
So, to return to Minou Drouet, the flurry of media attention 
was directed to precisely the same end. There were those who 
claimed that only the innocence and spontaneity of childhood 
could have produced these poems; there were others who insis­
ted that they bore the unmistakable mark of adult sophistication. 
Barthes pours scorn on both groups: as if childhood and adult­
hood were essences which existed autonomously, in complete 
isolation one from the other! Clearly the happiest outcome of the 
inquisition would have consisted in the proof that the poems 
were indeed the work of a child prodigy: as we all know, genius­
es are wild eccentric creatures, barely capable of lacing their 
own shoes; poets (cf. garrets) are little better, and children are 
not even held responsible in law. What a windfall, then, to find
5 In July 1955 Barthes himself became an ‘écrivain en vacances’, of sorts, 
when L ’Express recommended Mythologies as ‘à lire en vacances'.
 so much irresponsibility concentrated in a single figure! The
 pay-off of the operation is this: ‘croire au “génie” poétique de
 l 'enfance, c' est croire à une sorte de parthénogénèse littéraire,
 c' est poser une fois de plus la littérature comme un don des
dieux. Toute trace de "culture" est ici portée au compte du men- 
songe’ (p. 155). So, like the conventional signs of the traditional
 novel which immobilize History in an eternal bourgeois present,
 the myth of the irresponsibility of the writer serves to convert
 Culture into Nature, Existence into Essence. This is why Barthes
sees it as 'le mythe central de l 'art bourgeois’ (p. 153).
 In drawing his readers’ attention to the tautological nature of 
the arguments advanced for or against Minou Drouet, Barthes
 points to the parallel with the Dominici affair. An illiterate peas
ant, Gaston Dominici was condemned to death for the murder, in 
1952, of Sir Jack Drummond, his wife and daughter. Although
 his sentence was commuted to a prison term (he was freed in
 1960, ostensibly on compassionate grounds) the case is still re-
garded as a probable miscarriage of justice. In ‘Dominici ou le 
triomphe de la Littérature’, Barthes scrutinizes the speculative 
reasoning which condemned Dominici, in the absence of any 
concrete evidence. The reasoning of the court was founded on a 
spurious universalism: the belief that the prosecutor and judges 
spoke the same language as the accused, the belief that their 
minds worked in the same way. But any language implies a cast 
of mind, and this particular psychological system, inhabited by 
essentialist ‘types’ (‘vantard, coléreux, égoïste, rusé, paillard, 
dur . . .’) would doubtless have been recognized by contempo­
raries of Molière. For this notion of psychology is also ‘comme 
par hasard celle de la Littérature bien-pensante’ (p. 50). As if by 
chance . . .  As the rest of the essay demonstrates, chance has 
nothing to do with it. If Barthes’s conception of ideology is valid, 
then all manifestations of individual and collective life will be 
impregnated by the same ideological world-view -  in this case 
an essentialist view of human reality and the concomitant belief 
in the universality of that most perfect of communicative instru­
ments, the French language: ‘Or cette psychologie-là, au nom de 
quoi on peut très bien aujourd’hui vous couper la tête, elle vient 
en droite ligne de notre littérature traditionnelle, qu’on appelle
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en style bourgeois, littérature du Document humain [...] . Justice 
et littérature sont entrées en alliance, ont échangé leurs vieilles 
techniques, dévoilant ainsi leur identité profonde’ (p. 52). That 
is, the legal system and Literature are outgrowths of the same 
root-stock.
But it is also literature, albeit of a rather different sort, that 
provides Barthes with his tools of analysis. He himself points to 
the worrying similarity between Dominici and that other ‘coeur 
criminel ', Meursault in Camus’s L’Etranger. In both cases the 
court has recourse to the figure which Barthes calls Identifica­
tion (see p. 239), in order to endow the accused with a ‘cerveau 
de rechange’, all the better to condemn him. It should also be 
noted that, at a formal level, Camus’s book had sought to under­
mine that ‘écriture traditionnelle’ by eschewing, precisely, the 
third-person narrative voice and the past historic...
All bourgeois thought is tautological, since it posits implicit­
ly that which it claims to reveal, and it is with this notion of 
tautology that Barthes concludes his essay on Minou Drouet: 
‘Vouloir à grands cris que le Roman soit roman, la Poésie poésie 
et le Théâtre théâtre, cette tautologie stérile est de même sorte 
que les lois dénominatives qui régissent dans le Code civil la 
propriété des Biens’ (p. 160). As the context of this quotation 
makes clear, this particular tautology is especially characteristic 
of a discourse which presents itself — like the discourse of adver­
tising — as a mediation between producer and consumer: literary 
criticism.
ii) R ACINE EST RACINE
Critics, wrote Sartre, are the guardians of illustrious corpses: 
‘Tout se passe pour eux comme si la littérature tout entière 
n’était qu une vaste tautologie et comme si chaque nouveau 
prosateur avait inventé une nouvelle manière de parler pour ne 
rien dire’ (30, p. 38). And Barthes is scarcely more complimen­
tary: ‘Nos critiques essentialistes passent leur temps à retrouver 
la “vérité” des génies passés; la Littérature est pour eux un vaste 
magasin d’objets perdus, où l’on va à la pêche’ (p. 98). In the
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first of the Mythologies devoted to literary criticism, ‘Critique 
muette et aveugle’, Barthes analyses the unusual spectacle of a 
band of specialists who seem happy, even eager, to declare their 
own incompetence. But the confusion of these critics when faced 
with certain works (Existentialist and Marxist, as it so happens) 
is not what it appears: it is a ‘feinte panique d’imbécillité’ (p. 
36). Beneath this disarming modesty lies the most terrorist of 
positions: ‘Je ne comprends pas, donc vous êtes idiots’ (p. 37). 
The denunciation rests, implicitly, on the very myth which, when 
unleashed in the courtroom, assured the condemnation of 
Dominici. Namely, ‘la transparence et l’universalité du langage’ 
(p. 51).
It is clear from Barthes’s essay that he sees these ‘critiques 
bien-pensants’ as the direct heirs of Boileau, that scourge of 
poseurs, précieux and jargonizers:
Ce que l 'on conçoit bien s’énonce clairement,
Et les mots pour le dire arrivent aisément.6
When Boileau was writing, French was the language of a minor­
ity of the population: the aristocracy and bourgeoisie of the large 
towns. In other words, it was the language of the dominant class­
es, and the codification of the language reflected the dominant 
ideology. The watchwords were clarity and common sense. The 
latter is a seemingly inoffensive notion, but Barthes would, 
indeed does, argue that there is always something ‘terroristic’ 
about the appeal to common sense, about the evocation of 
‘ce-qui-va-de-soi’. Curiosity is stopped dead in its tracks; one 
is forced to recognize this timeless wisdom, forced to demur to 
the judgement of some vast but anonymous community of 
like-minded, right-thinking sages. We are dealing, then, with 
‘ce vieux mythe obscurantiste selon lequel l’idée est nocive, si 
elle n’est contrôlée par le “bon sens” et le “sentiment”: le Savoir, 
c’est le Mal’ (p. 37).
In ‘La critique Ni-Ni’, Barthes describes another operation 
designed to silence dissident voices by relegating them to the
6 Boileau, L ’A rt poétique, Bordas, 1972. Chant 1, vv. 153-54.
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limbo of their obscure jargon. He calls this device the Scales (‘la 
Balance’). This is how it works: take an ideology, such as Marx­
ism, and throw it in one pan; take another, such as Fascism, and 
place it in the other -  they cancel each other out, or better still, 
appear to be one and the same thing. But who is holding the 
scales? From which Olympian, or Archimedean, vantage point 
are Marxism, Fascism or Existentialism, judged to be ‘ideol­
ogies’? Clearly, the judgement is pronounced in the name of 
‘eternal truths’ such as ‘aventure, passion, grandeur, vertu, hon- 
neur’ (p. 145). In the name of some universal culture which arro­
gates to itself the right to judge without being judged: ‘La cul­
ture est un bien noble, universel, situé hors des partis pris 
sociaux: la culture ne pèse pas. Les idéologies, elles, sont des 
inventions partisanes: donc, à la balance!’ (p. 144). These ‘im­
partial’ critics are not so different from the politicians derided 
in ‘Grammaire africaine’: ‘Pour les gens de droite, la Politique, 
c’est la Gauche; eux, c’est la France’ (p. 140). This enormous 
operation -  which sees literary critics in alliance with politicians, 
journalists hand-in-glove with judges etc. -  cannot quite hide the 
fact that culture is fundamentally ideological, and we saw the 
nature of that ideology in the last chapter. Barthes’s point is this: 
there is no innocent discourse, and those discourses which 
attempt to hide their parti-pris beneath the invisible cloak of 
self-evidence are less innocent than most: ‘un jugement lit
téraire est toujours déterminé par la tonalité dont il fait partie, 
et l’absence même de système -  surtout porté à l’état de profes­
sion de foi -  procède d’un système parfaitement défini, qui est 
en l’occurrence une variété fort banale de l’idéologie bour
geoise’ (p. 145).
It is not so much the nature of the hidden system underlying 
bourgeois criticism that irks Barthes, as its insistence on playing 
hide-and-seek. This point is made with some force in one of his 
later critical essays. Referring to the celebrated critic Gustave 
Lanson, whose positivist approach still reigned supreme in 
academic circles of the 1950s, Barthes wrote: ‘Ce ne sont donc 
pas ses partis pris que l’on peut reprocher au lansonisme, c’est de 
les taire, de les couvrir du drapé moral de la rigueur et de l’objec- 
tivité’ (3, p. 254). This ‘perpétuel tourniquet entre la mauvaise
foi et la bonne conscience’ (5, p. 100) is, of course, nothing 
other than myth itself.
 Barthes returns to the charge in ‘Racine est Racine’. This 
essay, along with those already mentioned here, could be regarded 
as the opening salvos in the battle royal which was to rage after 
the publication of his iconoclastic Sur Racine (1963). Here is not 
the place to discuss that notorious Disputation, save to say that
 the terms in which Barthes’s adversaries responded, clearly indi
cated that he had hit a raw nerve with unerring accuracy. The
 title of this essay alludes to a statement made à propos of a new 
production at the Comédie Française: ‘Athalie est une pièce de 
Racine’ (p. 96). Well, yes. But what does this statement imply? 
Barthes brings out the colossal stupidity of the tautology, but 
also its hidden depths of aggression: ‘elle signifie une rupture 
rageuse entre l 'intelligence et son objet, la menace arrogante 
d’un ordre où l 'on ne penserait pas’ (p. 97). 
 The distinguished bourgeois critic Gustave Lanson would no
doubt have been surprised to learn that he would one day find
himself in bed with the king of the rutabaga, Pierre Poujade. But 
this is very much the logic of Barthes’s argument, for tautology,
with its covert appeal to ‘common sense’ and ‘clarity’, is invari- 
ably identified by Barthes as a petit-bourgeois mode of thought.
Classical Realism degenerated into the cheap Naturalism of Zola 
and his acolytes, and Zola, in his turn, has spawned horoscopes, 
agony aunts and . . .  ‘Les Romains au cinéma’. 
It is certainly no accident for Barthes that this downward spira
l tracks the shift of cultural hegemony from upper to lower 
middle class, from Classicism to Naturalism and the ‘culture de 
masse’ which is properly the object of Mythologies.
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iii) Ce plÉonasme d’intentions  
The savagery of Barthes’s assault on literary Naturalism is
 one of the more amusing features of Le Degré zéro: here was a 
form of literature whose practitioners aspired to the cool detachmen
t of the surgeon, the neutrality of the camera, but whose 
work was ‘chargée des signes les plus spectaculaires de la fabri-
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cation’ (7, p. 49). Here again, it was not so much the conventions 
or artifices of Naturalism that Barthes found so objectionable, as 
the attempt, simultaneously, to deny their existence. Naturalism 
is defined by its attempt to pass off its stale conventions as either 
natural, or spontaneously invented. As we saw in Chapter 1, this 
is precisely what characterizes myth itself. And it is this duplic­
ity that Barthes finds again and again in the cultural products of
the industrial society.
Take a film such as Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar. Despite the 
plethora of balding pates in Caesar’s Rome, Mankiewicz’s Ro­
mans all seem to be endowed with a spectacular fringe: ‘Les uns 
l’ont frisée, d’autres filiforme, d’autres huppée, d’autres huilée, 
tous l’ont bien peignée, et les chauves ne sont pas admis’ (p. 27). 
One can only assume that someone is trying to tell us something. 
This message is reinforced by the beads of (vaseline) perspira­
tion which permanently cover the foreheads of all the ‘thinking 
men’ in the film. These signs -  for this is what they are -  func­
tion as a kind of shorthand: the fringe is the sign of ‘romanité’, 
just as the excessive perspiration is taken to indicate the appall­
ing toll exacted on the body by any form of intellectual activ­
ity. One could add to this catalogue the trailing lock of hair -  in 
an otherwise immaculate coiffure -  which is meant to alert us to 
the fact that the character has been hauled from her bed in the 
middle of the night. Barthes finds here precisely the same du­
plicity as in the Naturalist novel: ‘[Le signe] veut faire com- 
prendre (ce qui est louable), mais se donne en même temps pour 
spontané (ce qui est triché), il se déclare à la fois intentionnel et 
irrépressible, artificiel et naturel, produit et trouvé [. . .] s’il est 
heureux qu’un spectacle soit fait pour rendre le monde plus clair, 
il y a une duplicité coupable à confondre le signe et le signifié. 
Et c’est une duplicité propre au spectacle bourgeois’ (p. 30).
It seems that no art form is immune to this mystificatory 
procedure, not even music. In a recording of Fauré by the bari­
tone Gérard Souzay, Barthes detects a ‘surcharge d’intentions’ in 
the singer’s almost comical efforts to wring the last grain of 
meaning from the words he is singing: a ‘pléonasme d'inten­
tions’ which succeeds in smothering not only the words and the 
music, but also the subtlety of their interplay. In ‘Photos-chocs’
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and ‘Photogénie électorate’ the same ‘pléonasme detentions’ is 
seen at work in the medium of photography. Elsewhere it leaves 
its mark on the theatre, more particularly the bourgeois theatre. 
The melodramatic diction of 'les acteurs traditionnels’ is de­
signed to make their inner turmoil visible for all to see. The 
spectacle of their suffering (‘un travail physiologique effroyable, 
une torsion monstrueuse des tissus internes’, p. 108) is the pre­
cise equivalent of Souzay’s emphatic phrasing or the perspiring 
brows of Mankiewicz’s Romans, and it is not so far removed 
from the grimace of the all-in wrestler caught in a particularly 
gruesome half-nelson (see ‘Le monde où l 'on catche’). But 
at least the wrestler’s grimace is not intended to fool anyone, 
it signifies pain rather than expressing it. The problem with 
Naturalism is that it continually blurs this distinction between 
signification and expression: ‘l'expressivité est un mythe: elle 
n’est que la convention de l’expressivité’ (1, p. 50).
All of this explains why Barthes refers to bourgeois art as 
‘un art du détail’. There is an inference to be drawn from 
Souzay’s pointilliste technique, or from the technical ‘trou­
vailles’ which seem to be the sine qua non of popular success in 
the theatre: namely, that bourgeois art is little more than an 
accounting exercise. The object of this exercise is to ‘faire de 
la “psychologie” un phénomène quantitatif [. . .] en sorte que la 
passion devienne elle aussi une marchandise comme les autres, 
un objet de commerce, inséré dans un système numérique 
d’échange’ (p. 108). This also explains the pun in ‘un art du 
détail’: an art of accumulated details, but also a retail art. For all 
commodities in the mass society, including cultural ones, are 
subject to ‘la dure loi de l’échange’ (p. 109), and Barthes rather 
unkindly posits a population of readers, theatre-goers, listeners, 
and viewers endowed with all the critical percipience of M. Pou- 
jade! For this public, value for money must be highly visible: Te 
théâtre est toujours l’objet d’un contrat entre le spectateur qui 
donne son argent, et le directeur qui doit lui rendre cet argent 
sous la forme la plus visible possible’ (3, p. 57). The quotation 
continues: ‘aujourd’hui la richesse coûte trop cher, on se con- 
tente du simili’ (idem). As Mythologies progresses, Barthes uses 
this notion of the simili (an imitation substance such as paste dia­-
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monds or false fur) with increasing frequency, to symbolize the 
degradations of petit bourgeois culture. Mass society is the glori­
fication of the spectacular, the illusory, the ephemeral, and the 
artist who is willing to pander to this cultural Poujadism must 
also be willing to see his art dragged not only into the supermar­
ket, but into the comer shop.
There is also a ‘constructive’ side to Barthes’s critique of 
Naturalism and its modern avatars. His opposition is program­
matic insofar as he is eager to promote certain counter-mythical 
alternatives. One of these is the notion of ‘literality’, presented 
as the precise opposite of this ‘métaphore du détail’: it seemed 
for a time that Barthes had found his champion of literality in 
the novelist Alain Robbe-Grillet and his ‘littérature littérale’. But 
this is perhaps best left to the next chapter, which will be devoted 
to a consideration of Barthes’s various counter-mythical tactics. 
It was in fact the German theoretician and playwright Berthold 
Brecht who turned out to be Barthes’s staunchest theoretical ally 
at this period. The 1950s were Barthes’s ‘theatre years’ and he 
did as much as anyone, through his articles in Théâtre populaire 
and elsewhere, to promote Brecht’s work in France. The latter’s 
contribution to the war on Naturalism was twofold. Ideologically, 
he countered the bourgeois myth of irresponsibility by demon­
strating that 'les maux des hommes sont entre les mains des 
hommes eux-mêmes, c’est-à-dire que le monde est maniable’ (3, 
p. 52). But it was the way he did this that impressed Barthes 
most. Brecht’s theatre was the opposite of naturalistic, in that it 
refused to blur the distinction between the conventional and the 
natural. By advertising its own artifices it sought actively to pre­
vent the audience from falling victim to the myth of expressivity. 
By preventing (or trying to prevent . . .) identification between 
the audience and the characters, Brecht’s theatre forced the audi­
ence to retain a certain critical distance. The desired effect was 
quite the opposite of the passive consumerism fostered by the 
bourgeois theatre.
Indirectly, Brecht provided Barthes with the criteria for mak­
ing value-judgements. On the one side, Naturalism with its insid­
ious conflation of semiology and ideology, on the other the 
frankness of the Brechtian position which laid all its cards on the
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table. On the one hand, the ‘maladies des costumes de théâtre’, 
on the other the ‘santé du signe’. This dividing line is the same 
as the one which informs Barthes’s strictures on bourgeois crit­
icism: the duplicity of a critical system which pretends not to be 
one, versus the ‘franchise du système’.
In light of this, one would expect Barthes’s attitude towards 
the ‘Littérature du monde petit-bourgeois’ (p. 168) to be one of 
unalloyed abhorrence and unrelenting hostility. This is not quite 
the case. As I will now suggest, there are moments when he 
hesitates, as if paralysed both by the ambiguity of his object 
and by the ambivalence of his own feelings.
iv) U n e  ré co n cilia tio n  d u  ré el  et  d es h o m m es
The creation of the Tour de France in 1903 by the en­
trepreneur Henri Desgranges sprang from both nationalistic and 
economic motives. This trial of sporting prowess was consonant 
with the proto-fascistic promotion of the body beautiful -  bur­
geoning gymnastic societies, rugby clubs etc. -  following defeat 
at the hands of the Prussians in 1871. It corresponded to a tough 
new national self-image which was, needless to say, entirely 
mythical. At the same time, and as if by magic, it was a boon for 
the emergent French sports press, in which Desgranges himself 
had a considerable stake, and for sponsoring manufacturers such 
as Michelin (see 21, p. 368). I mention these points precisely be­
cause, in ‘Le Tour de France comme épopée’, Barthes does not, 
or hardly. It is true that he mentions, twice in eleven pages, the 
‘déterminismes économiques de notre grande épopée’ (p. 118), 
but this recall to reality appears almost grudging, for the form. It 
as if his fascination with the literariness of this myth outweighed 
his obligation to denounce its ideological abuses. He appears 
eager to justify his fascination, arguing that despite being a cata­
logue of ‘impostures traditionnelles’ thrown up as a smoke- 
screen to mask the ‘mobiles économiques’ of the Tour, this myth 
has a certain liberating potential. It allows one to glimpse 
‘l’image utopique d’un monde qui cherche obstinément à se ré
concilier par le spectacle d’une clarté totale des rapports entre 
l’homme, les hommes et la Nature’ (p. 119).
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A similar idea is floated in the earliest essay in the volume, 
‘Le monde où l 'on catche’, where the spectacle of all-in 
wrestling gestures towards ‘une intelligence idéale des choses, 
[. . .] une euphorie des hommes, haussés pour un temps hors de 
l’ambiguïté constitutive des situations quotidiennes et installés 
dans la vision panoramique d’une Nature univoque’ (p. 23). 
Given that the contradictions inherent to capitalist society can 
only be resolved, in reality, by action and not by fables, both 
myths are ultimately alienating. But not entirely. It is as if ‘Le 
Tour de France comme épopée’ marked a return to the Olympian 
myth which served as a model for many of the earlier mythol­
ogies,; that is to say, a vision of myth as potentially heuristic, or 
at least evidential: an indirect representation of the objective 
contradictions which vitiate the relations between man and man, 
man and the world.
So, alienation or liberation? Barthes’s ambivalence can be 
traced through three essays which are closely linked in their pre­
occupations: ‘Celle qui voit clair’, ‘Astrologie’ and ‘La Dame 
aux camélias’. The analysis of the ‘agony aunt’ columns of the 
popular women’s magazines is rather negative. The ideological 
operation is particularly pernicious in that the surface morality 
of Feminine Independence ‘entraîne naturellement une impuis
sance compléte à toute ouverture sur le monde réel’ (p. 127). 
The function of the ‘Courrier du Coeur’ is to imprison women in 
a kind of psychological gynaeceum: a harem to which only men 
hold the key. The solutions put forward by the agony aunt invari­
ably assume a single universal panacea: find yourself a man! 
Preferably a rich one. Even the apparently liberating advice to ‘se 
moquer des hommes, se serrer les coudes entre femmes’ (p. 127) 
masks the whiff of sour grapes: it is a meagre compensation for 
the ultimate humiliation of having been rejected by a man in the 
first place. The advice, then, is entirely parasitic; it simply rein­
forces the image of women as relative beings. But the really sig­
nificant thing about the ‘Courrier du Coeur’ is that it is a ‘monde 
d’essences’. These essences, puella, conjux and mulier, are sanc­
tioned by the statute book: ‘loin de tout romantisme ou de toute 
investigation un peu réelle du vécu, [la typologie] suit au plus 
près un ordre stable des essences, celui du Code civil’ (p. 126).
However, it is precisely an ‘investigation un peu réelle du 
vécu’ that Barthes discovers in that other staple of women’s mag­
azines, the horoscope. He notes with a degree of surprise that 
‘on n’y trouve nul monde onirique [as in ‘Celle qui voit clair’], 
mais plutôt une description étroitement réaliste d’un milieu 
social précis, celui des lectrices du journal’ (p. 166). At bottom, 
the solutions to the problems which beset the women readers are 
no less mystificatory than those proposed by the agony aunts; 
they tend to cancel each other out by ‘le balancement des possi
bles’: the meeting of Neptune and Uranus in Capricorn might 
signal the start of a beautiful friendship, on the other hand 
it might presage its end! Moreover, the reader’s alienation is 
reflected back to her in a fragmented fashion: there is no sugges­
tion that her lack of job prospects, her stormy home life and the 
claustrophobia of her social circle might actually be expressions 
of a single problem: ‘rien qui, d’un horaire à l’autre, puisse sug
gérer l’idée d’une aliénation totale’ (p. 166). And yet. And yet 
Barthes is insistent that, precisely because of its descriptive real­
ism, the horoscope is not escapist like the agony column, but 
‘évidence réaliste des conditions de vie de l’employée, de la 
vendeuse’ (p. 168). It is for this reason that the horoscope finds a 
place among ‘toutes les entreprises de semi-aliénation (ou de 
semi-libération) qui se donnent à tâche d’objectiver le réel, sans 
pourtant aller jusqu’à le démystifier’ (p. 168). The most inter­
esting of these undertakings is, of course, Literature itself; espe­
cially the realist novel in the bourgeois tradition which this 
chapter started by analysing.
We find the same ambivalence in the penultimate essay in 
the volume, ‘La Dame aux camélias’. Marguerite Gautier is 
caught in the same trap as the correspondents to the agony 
columns or the readers of horoscopes: she knows that she is 
alienated, but her conduct simply reinforces her alienation. She 
perceives her sickness but is blind to the remedies. Barthes 
defines her consciousness as semi-lucid, and once again his 
ambivalence is articulated in this alternative between (semi-) 
alienation and (semi-)liberation.
How are we to understand this hesitation? There are a num­
ber of factors at play. First, it is notable that Barthes supposes the
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consumers of these particular myths to belong to social groups 
vis-à-vis which he, as a middle-class intellectual, harbours a 
strange inferiority complex not atypical of other left-wing intel­
lectuals of the period: wrestling and the Tour de France are pop­
ular entertainments. The readers of horoscopes are women -  
they may belong to the hated petite bourgeoisie, but they find 
grace in Barthes’s eyes by virtue of the fact that their alienated 
condition at least makes them marginal within that class. One is 
reminded of Barthes’s lament about the loneliness of the ‘mytho
logue’ in ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’: ‘Déchiffrer le Tour de France, 
le bon Vin de France, e’est s’abstraire de ceux qui s’en dis
traient, de ceux qui s’en réchauffent’ (p. 245). Another important 
factor is highlighted by Philippe Roger, who writes: ‘Le 
paradoxe central des Mythologies est là: tous leurs bonheurs 
d’écriture, Barthes les doit précisément à l’engluement, à la 
fascination, à cette “compacité savoureuse” que le sémiologue 
empoissé doit s’imputer à crime’ (27, p. 98). This would certain­
ly explain the fascination with the literary myth of the Tour de 
France to which I drew attention earlier. It explains also the lov­
ing care with which Barthes reconstitutes the myths, before dis­
mantling them. Clearly, myth is not simply an object of denunci­
ation, it is also a pretext for writing.
This last point is closely related to a final factor upon which 
I have inevitably already touched: the possibility of literature 
being turned to counter-mythical ends. Having condemned the 
ultimately mystificatory presentation of Marguerite in La Dame 
aux camélias, Barthes remarks that it would not have taken very 
much for the character to be a ‘source de critique’ rather than an 
‘objet aliéne’. What it would have taken, in fact, is for the play to 
have been written by Brecht rather than Dumas. The problem is 
Marguerite’s semi-lucidity: if she had been presented as wholly 
blind (‘sotte dérisoirement’) then the spectacle of her blindness 
might have caused the scales to fall from the eyes of the audi­
ence. In a 1955 article on Brecht’s Mother Courage and her 
Children, Barthes had drawn his readers’ attention to precisely 
this mechanism. It is the total blindness -  as opposed to a decep­
tive semi-lucidity -  of Mother Courage that obliges the audience 
to see not only her blindness, but also the reality to which she is
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blind. The idea is formulated most clearly in ‘Le Pauvre et le 
Prolétaire’: ‘Or Chariot, conformément a l’idée de Brecht, montre 
sa cécité au public de telle sorte que le public voit à la fois 
l’aveugle et son spectacle; voir quelqu’un ne pas voir, c’est la 
meilleure façon de voir intensément ce qu’il ne voit pas’ (p. 41).
Interestingly enough, it is this same metaphor of blindness 
and insight that informs Barthes’s comments, in ‘Le mythe, 
aujourd’hui’, on literature as counter-myth. Writing of Flaubert’s 
Bouvard et Pécuchet, he says: ‘Le pouvoir du second mythe, 
c’est de fonder le premier en naïveté regardée ' (p. 223, my ital­
ics). Literature, or at least ‘writing’, may be myth, but it is possi­
ble to imagine a counter-mythical literature, a few examples of 
which may already exist: Flaubert, Brecht, Queneau, Robbe-
Grillet. It is perhaps this-along with his writerly fascination 
for the objects of this world -  that most fully explains Barthes’s 
ambivalence to the literariness of myth. As Philippe Roger has 
put it: ‘la visée mythologique [. . .] est d’explorer les voies d’un 
“romanesque” de type nouveau’ (27, p. 99).
Through the insight it provided Barthes into the connotative 
mechanism of myth, Literature is at the origin of Mythologies. 
Through the counter-mythical vistas it opens up, literature is also 
perhaps at the end. Barthes the ‘mythologist’ may not be in a 
‘situation moïséenne’ (p. 246), but Barthes the écrivain is of­
fered a teasing glimpse of the promised land: ‘une réconciliation 
du réel et des hommes, de la description et de 1’explication, de 
l’objet et du savoir’ (p. 247).
Tactics without a strategy
4
‘II n ’est point de serpent, ni de monstre odieux.
Qui par l 'art imité, ne puisse plaire aux yeux.’
Boileau
The necessity of combating myth is never doubted by Barthes; 
the problems begin with method, and these problems are 
the consequence of certain characteristics of the mythical dis­
course itself. The first of these is its ubiquity: everything can be 
a myth; nothing, ultimately, is safe from myth. In ‘Le mythe, 
aujourd’hui’ Barthes despondently records the failure of some 
recent literary attempts to escape the clutches of myth. He had 
argued in Le Degré zéro that ‘Le consentement volontaire au 
mythe peut d’ailleurs définir toute notre Littérature tradition
nelle’ (p. 221), but even writers who have subsequently attempt­
ed to withdraw their ‘consent’, who have tried to place them­
selves out of reach of myth, have not fared so well. The metrical 
irregularity and disjointed syntax of much modem poetry can be 
seen as an attempt to subvert the Order connoted by the very reg­
ularity of classical verse. But undeterred, myth simply seizes on 
this attempted subversion and uses it to signify itself: ‘en refu
sant farouchement le mythe, la poésie se livre à lui pieds et 
poings liés’ (p. 220). Similarly, it might be thought that a totally 
unambiguous ‘parole’, such as formal logic or mathematical 
symbolism, offered no foothold for myth: a seamless suit of 
armour presenting no chink or crevice upon which myth could 
gain purchase. But Barthes shows in ‘Le cerveau d’Einstein’, 
and again in ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’, that the language of math­
ematics is no more invulnerable than modem poetry: ‘aucune 
signification parasite ne peut s’insinuer en [le langage mathéma
tique]. Et c’est pourquoi précisément le mythe va l’emporter en 
bloc; il prendra telle formule mathématique (E = mc2), et fera de 
ce sens inaltérable le signifiant pur de la mathématicité’ (p. 219). 
The prognosis is gloomy: ‘Le mythe peut tout atteindre, tout
corrompre, et jusqu’au mouvement même qui se refuse à lui’ 
(p. 219). Why is this a problem for the would-be mythologist? 
Because it confronts him with the spectre of failure even before 
he has set pen to paper: if what has been argued is correct, then 
the language used by the mythologist himself risks falling victim 
to the very myth it is attempting to dispel.
‘Le mythe est toujours un vol de langage’ (p. 217), writes 
Barthes. And herein lies a second problem: the theft of language 
perpetrated by myth is so subtle that nothing appears to have 
been taken. How do you alert a blasé public to an effraction 
which you cannot prove to have happened in the first place? This 
is what Barthes means when he refers to the ‘improbable’ nature 
of myth: at once ‘unlikely’ and ‘improvable’. If myth is a ‘signi­
fication qui est reçue, mais qui n’est pas lue’ (3, p. 235), he must 
demonstrate this ‘vol de langage’ with sufficient cogency for his 
readers to be obliged -  despite their bad faith or scepticism -  to 
graduate from passive reception to active decipherment.
It seems that the most Barthes could hope to achieve would 
be a generalized deconditioning of the public with regard to 
myth, something akin to the ‘déconditionnement du lecteur par 
rapport à l’art essentialiste du roman bourgeois’ (3, p. 70), which 
he sees as the aim of Robbe-Grillet’s novels.
So one way of approaching the stylistic features of Mythol­
ogies is to see them as a tactical response to the specific prob­
lems encountered by anyone who sets out to explain the way 
myth functions and what purposes it serves in our society.
Myth is axiomatic: it operates a sort of fusion of fact and 
value, it is assertive. One way of countering myth is to reply in 
kind, to adopt an axiological language which is as unanswerable 
as myth itself. The first ‘tactic’ I shall examine involves the 
assumption on Barthes’s part of an authoritative position 
from which to speak: if one is trading blows with an adversary, 
it is advisable to be standing on firm ground at the time.
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i) SOYEZ SÛRS QUE LE MARXISTE LEFEBVRE COMPREND 
PARFAITEMENT.. .
In ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’, Barthes writes: ‘tout, dans notre 
vie quotidienne, est tributaire de la représentation que la bour­
geoisie se fa it et nous fa it des rapports de l’homme et du monde’ 
(p. 227). If this ‘representation’ is a mystification, as Barthes 
clearly believes it is, what would constitute a true representa­
tion? In the postface, a Marxist vision of true, or real, social rela­
tions is explicitly invoked as a counterweight to the inverted 
image of reality conveyed by myth. Marx is actually named and 
quoted, albeit in a footnote, as authoritative support. But the 
essays themselves are far less explicit. Here, a Marxist position 
is indirectly evoked, rather than openly adopted.
The occasions on which Barthes actually nails his colours to 
the mast are relatively rare. One example is, however, to be found 
at the end of ‘Critique muette et aveugle’ where he clearly aligns 
himself with the Marxist sociologist Henri Lefebvre (p. 37). 
Similarly, in ‘La grande famille des hommes’, we find the pre­
scriptive statement: ‘L’humanisme progressiste, au contraire, doit 
toujours penser à inverser les termes de cette très vieille impos­
ture, à décaper sans cesse la nature, ses “lois” et ses “limites” 
pour y découvrir l’Histoire et poser enfin la Nature comme elle-
même historique’ (p. 175). But even here Barthes stops short of 
naming this ‘humanisme progressiste’, except by circumlocu­
tion, as if he was reluctant to identify himself too explicitly with 
a doctrinaire position.
All the elements of a Marxist world-view are present in the 
essays: the assumption that the deepest, most thoroughly obfus­
cated level is that of economics; the division of society into 
antagonistic classes; the alienation and reification of man under 
capitalism; the necessity of dialectical thought as a counter to 
bourgeois reason etc. But this world-view is more often conno­
ted, in exactly the same way that myth connotes the ‘représenta­
tion que la bourgeoisie se fa it et nous fa it des rapports de 
l’homme et du monde’ (p. 227).
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The economic determinants which myth strives to hide are 
frequently suggested by a single word. In ‘Conjugates’ we read 
'le mensonge, l’exploitation, la cupidité, tout le mal social bour­
geois est renfloué par la vérité du couple’ (p. 47). Or, in the 
same essay, ‘que ce bonheur, par définition mesquin, puisse être 
cependant choisi, voilà qui renfloue les millions de Français qui 
le partagent par condition’ (p. 48). And again, in ‘La croisière du 
Sang bleu’: ‘forts de leur divinité renflouée, les princes font 
démocratiquement de la politique’ (p. 35). ‘Renflouer’ functions 
here as Barthes’s own myth-word. The most usual sense of the 
word is to ‘refloat’ or ‘bale out’ (a vessel, or a person in diffi­
culties), but it is also commonly used in economics to refer to a 
financial rescue achieved by injecting new cash into an ailing 
business. Similarly, when he uses the verb ‘relancer’ (in ‘Conju­
gales’ or ‘Dominici’ for example) he is playing on the, at the 
time, neologistic meaning of ‘to boost a business’ or ‘stimulate 
the economy’. The effect of these words, especially when used 
persistently, is to give a jolt to the reader, to remind him of what, 
at bottom, is really at stake.
As Barthes himself remarks in Roland Barthes par Roland 
Barthes, these economic or political ‘reminders.’ are often deliv­
ered in the form of a sting in the tail, a delayed punch-line. 
Sometimes this ‘pointe finale’ is quite direct, as in ‘Saponides et 
détergents’ (p. 40). Elsewhere, the jolt is more subtle, more of an 
nudge and a wink than an elbow in the ribs. Take for example 
the ending of ‘L’acteur d’Harcourt’: ‘ne pas suspendre aux 
escaliers les d’Harcourt classiques [. . .], c’est une audace dont 
bien peu de théâtres se payent le luxe’ (p. 27). Here the literal, 
pecuniary meaning of ‘se payer’ interferes with the common fig­
urative meaning of ‘se payer le luxe de . . .’, in order to empha­
size the fact that, like bourgeois marriages (see ‘Conjugales’, p. 
47), bourgeois art is ‘une opération fructueuse de comptabilité’.
The notion of class is used by Barthes whenever he needs to 
counter bourgeois attempts to de-politicize social conflict by 
recourse to categories such as ‘caste’ or ‘human nature’. In 
‘Le Guide Bleu’ he shows how, in the Hachette tourist guide, the 
real specificity of Spain’s ethnic mix is ‘réduite à un vaste ballet 
classique, une sorte de commedia dell’arte fort sage, dont la
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typologie improbable sert à masquer le spectacle réel des condi­
tions, des classes et des métiers’ (p. 122). On occasion, he is not 
above resorting to a table-thumping rhetoric that any PCF (Parti 
Communiste Français) apparatchik would have been proud of: 
‘l’individualisme est un mythe bourgeois qui permet de vacciner 
d’une liberté inoffensive l’ordre et la tyrannie de classe’ (p. 133).
But table-thumping was not really Barthes’s style, whatever 
the cause. The discomfiture of his position can be glimpsed in 
the piece on Charlie Chaplin, ‘Le Pauvre et le Prolétaire’. The 
essay opens with the remark that Chaplin’s latest gag was to 
donate half of his ‘prix soviétique’ to Abbé Pierre’s fighting 
fund! Hardly an act guaranteed to endear Chaplin to the author 
of ‘Iconographie de l’abbé Pierre’: ‘Au fond, cela revient à établir 
une égalité de nature entre le prolétaire et le pauvre’ (p. 40). Yet 
Barthes cannot bring himself to condemn Chaplin; he talks 
rather of the ‘political ambiguity’ of Chaplin’s productions, in 
particular of Modern Times. What Chaplin shows us, says 
Barthes, is the individual, isolated by his poverty and unable 
to transcend this isolation towards collective struggle: that is, 
to pass from ‘pauvre’ to ‘prolétaire’. Nevertheless, despite 
being ‘discutable politiquement’ (Barthes’s political super-ego 
talking . . .), his anarchy ‘représente en art la forme peut-être la 
plus efficace de la révolution’ (p. 42). The fact is that the alter­
native was not very seductive: ‘En montrant l’ouvrier déj à en­
gagé dans un combat conscient, subsumé sous la Cause et le 
Parti, les autres oeuvres rendent compte d’une réalité politique 
nécessaire, mais sans force esthétique’ (p. 41). Given that ‘les 
autres oeuvres’ is Barthes’s way of alluding to the current prod­
ucts of socialist realism, one can only admire the delicacy of the 
understatement contained in the last phrase: the section of Le 
Degré zéro entitled ‘Ecriture et Révolution’ consists of a critical 
lapidation of socialist realism, more savage than anything 
Barthes wrote about any bourgeois writer. His comments on 
Roger Garaudy give some idea of the tone: ‘Evidemment, il faut 
faire la part de la médiocrité; dans le cas de Garaudy, elle est im­
mense’ (1, p. 52). In discussing alternatives, it is important to 
bear in mind that Barthes did not believe in the existence of a 
genuine working-class culture, or even that such an autonomous 
culture was a possibility in the circumstances (p. 226).
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So, returning to the quotation from ‘Le Pauvre et le Prolé- 
taire’, Barthes seems to be stuck between ethics and esthetics: 
the one is necessary, but the other is desirable.
One critic has summed up Barthes’s position in these terms: 
‘When in Degree Zero Barthes described the sort of political 
axiological writing which presents a theory as a fact, he clearly 
spoke as one oppressed by it: he views it with more lightness of 
heart in ‘Myth Today’ because there he is using it himself and 
believes in its necessity’ (20, p. 115). But not, I think, in its 
truth-value. It can be seen that Barthes’s appropriation of a 
‘strong discourse’ like Marxism has a purely tactical value in 
Mythologies; it is an expedient which must be adopted despite its 
inconveniences. And there are plenty of these. An episode from 
this period captures the essence of Barthes’s unease. The first 
half of 1955 was marked by a polemic with Albert Camus over 
an article on La Peste which Barthes had published in February 
of that year. In this article he had criticized Camus’s novel for 
its lack of ‘solidarity’ and its ‘refusal of History’. Having 
survived -  albeit battered and bruised -  a similar and far more 
traumatic attack at the hands of the team of Sartre’s Temps 
Modernes, Camus was more than capable of defending himself; 
he countered the second point by demanding that Barthes lay his 
cards on the table: from precisely what point of view was 
Barthes speaking when he criticized his, Camus’s, conception of 
History? Outmanoeuvred and with his back to the wall, Barthes 
had little choice but to grit his teeth and declare his point of view 
to be that of ‘historical materialism’. This open declaration of 
a position must have been acutely embarrassing for Barthes, 
especially when one recalls that here was a man whose political 
activism never even extended to putting his name to a petition, 
let alone ‘coming down on to the streets’.
The basic problem, however, was one he shared with others 
on the non-communist Left: the route for a ‘fellow traveller’ of 
the Stalinist PCF was not an easy one, especially when it was 
strewn with ‘pavés’ produced by the likes of Garaudy and Stil!
‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’ adds another strong discourse to 
Barthes’s arsenal in the form of semiology. However, the essays 
themselves — whilst certainly studying the ‘life of signs within
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society’ -  are not, thankfully, exercises in semiological analysis 
of quite the type adumbrated in the postface. If Barthes had 
wielded in Mythologies the cumbersome theoretical machinery 
that was to lumber through the three hundred pages of Système 
de la mode, the essays would very soon have become intolerably 
repetitive. The only ‘hard currency’ imported from linguistic 
science is the denotation/connotation distinction, but its value is 
decisive, not only to the way Barthes conceptualizes myth, but 
also to the way he himself writes about it. This much is made clear 
by Stephen Heath: ‘il s’agissait de décrire le procès de significa­
tion de la parole mythique, et ainsi de la défaire, de donner à 
lire l’appropriation idéologique qu’elle opère -  le schéma de la 
connotation foumissant à la fois le moyen de comprendre 
cette opération et celui de représenter cette compréhension, 
de la montrer’ (19, p. 65).
We have just seen how Barthes’s writing characteristically 
connotes the authority of a Marxist discourse, instead of using 
it in a systematic way. But this is only one instance of a more 
generalized tactic; and this consists not in talking about myth 
by means of an ‘analytic’ metalanguage (be it Marxist, psycho­
analytic or linguistic), but rather in extending it: myth is copied, 
or mimicked, and in the process magnified in such a way that 
its operations are exposed to scrutiny and derision.
ii) L ire  ‘M y t h o l o g ie s ’ c o m m e  u n  r o m a n  d e  F l a u b er t
‘La meilleure arme contre le mythe’, speculates Barthes, 
‘c’est peut-être de le mythifier à son tour, c’est de produire un 
mythe artificiel: et ce mythe reconstitué sera une véritable 
mythologie’ (p. 222). The example he gives of such an ‘artificial 
myth’ is Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet. In this book, claims 
Barthes, Flaubert has copied a certain bourgeois ideology, recon­
stituting it in the way that the archeological restorer Eugène Viol
let-le-Duc had imaginatively restored Gothic cathedrals, but with 
one crucial difference: ‘moins naïf  que Viollet-le-Duc, il a dis­
posé dans sa reconstitution des ornements supplémentaires qui la 
démystifient’ (p. 223). A footnote specifies that the principal
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‘ornament of style’ added by Flaubert is the ‘style indirect libre’. 
This narrative device, much affected by Flaubert, has the effect 
of introducing a subtle yet pervasive irony into the narrative; the 
reader is never quite certain how seriously the narrative is in­
tended to be taken: the actions and words of the characters are 
mediated by a vaguely sarcastic presence, but a presence which 
is felt rather than perceived, and which one would be hard 
pressed to ascribe to a personal narrator, still less to the author 
himself. Barthes later commented on Flaubert’s use of this 
device: "‘on ne sait jamais s ’il est responsable de ce qu’il écrit 
(s’il y a un sujet derrière son langage); car l’être de l’écriture (le 
sens du travail qui la constitue) est d’empêcher de jamais répon
dre à cette question: Qui parle?’ (7, p. 146). It is possible that 
Flaubert’s uses of uncertainty were not as dazzlingly modernistic 
as Barthes claims, but there is no doubting his admiration for 
this writer who made irony his stock-in-trade.
Barthes once defined irony as 'la question posée au langage 
par le langage’ (4, p. 74). The language which is being ques­
tioned in Mythologies is the language of myth, and I will now 
consider just a few of the myriad ways Barthes finds of asking 
this question.
One commentator has described the typical pattern of the 
essays in Mythologies as ‘starting with the detail which “interpel­
lated” Barthes and indicated the presence of a myth’, followed 
by a ‘supple mimetic description, the seductive aspects of which 
make myth attractive and thus credible’ (20, p. 105). By no 
means all of the essays follow this pattern, but a great many do 
include reproductions of the myth they are analysing. Take, for 
example, the following description of the mythical qualities of 
milk: 'le lait est contraire au feu par toute sa densité moléculaire, 
par la nature crémeuse, et done sopitive, de sa nappe; le vin est 
mutilant, chirurgical, il transmute et accouche; le lait est cosmé
tique, il lie, recouvre, restaure. De plus, sa pureté, associée à 
l 'innocence enfantine, est un gage de force, d’une force non 
révulsive, non congestive, mais calme, blanche, lucide, tout 
égale au réel’ (pp. 76-77). At this point the reader is on the verge 
of doubling his order, and writing a letter of tearful gratitude 
to the Milk Marketing Board . . . only to be shaken out of his
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rêverie by the remark that this is actually ‘[un] mythe parsi
falien’ -  and one which goes some way towards explaining why 
milk-shake is so popular amongst Parisian ‘thugs and hard-nuts’ 
(p. 77). Milk, when all is said and done, is just milk. The 
description of the ‘Nouvelle Citroën’, likewise, is more alluring, 
more seductive than any advertising copy could ever be: ‘La 
Déesse est visiblement exaltation de la vitre, et la tôle n’y est 
qu’une base. Ici, les vitres ne sont pas fenêtres, ouvertures per
cees dans la coque obscure, elles sont grands pans d’air et 
de vide, ayant le bombage étalé et la brillance des bulles de 
savon, la minceur dure d’une substance plus entomologique que 
minérale’ (p. 151). The rhythm, the soft alliterations and the 
musical hendecasyllable (‘ouvertures percées . . .’) with its Mal
larmean resonances: all of this points to an attempt to seduce. 
But this seductive beauty is swiftly defiled: ‘les tôles, les joints 
sont touchés, les rembourrages palpés, les sièges essayés, les 
portes caressées, les coussins pelotés’ (p. 152). This second 
passage, in which Barthes himself exploits the full resources 
of (sexual) connotation, encapsulates the message of the essay: 
that the Déesse is a fetishized object in every sense of the term.
The loving reconstitution of the myth could be seen as the 
statement of the ‘thesis’ or doxa, which is then contested by anti­
thesis or paradox. These two rhetorical figures are used exten­
sively in Mythologies. In Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes, he 
comments on his use of antithesis in these terms: ‘L’Antithèse 
est un vol de langage: j ’emprunte la violence du discours 
courant au profit de ma propre violence, du sens-pour-moi' (9, 
p. 142). And paradox is identified as the figure which defines 
the dialectic of his whole oeuvre (9, p. 75). Examples of these 
two figures abound in Mythologies: ‘Passé de la “scène” à la 
“ville”, l’acteur d’Harcourt n ’abandonne nullement le “rêve” 
pour la “réalite”. C’est tout le contraire . . . ’ (p. 25); ‘Mais on au-
rait bien tort de prendre cela pour un effort de démystification. 
C’est tout le contraire . . .’ (pp. 32-33); ‘La liberté apparente des 
conseils dispense de la liberté réelle des conduites . . .’ (p. 128); 
'la liberté en vitrine, à titre décoratif, mais l’Ordre chez soi, à 
titre constitutif’ (p. 133). On occasion he takes irony one step 
further by casting his antithesis in the form of the hated bour­-
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geois aphorism: ‘Un peu de mal “avoué” dispense de reconnaître 
beaucoup de mal caché’ (p. 46).
By this tactical manoeuvre, the seductive power of the recon­
structed myth is undermined retroactively, by the ‘ornement 
supplémentaire’ of antithesis. Elsewhere, the language used to 
render the myth carries within it the seeds of doubt. This is 
particularly the case where Barthes resorts to a form of mock- 
heroic parody, or overstatement, designed to provoke mirth on 
the part of the reader. The description of the spectacle offered by 
an actor of the ‘young theatre’ is a case in point: ‘II faut à tout 
prix “bouillir”, c’est-à-dire à la fois brûler et se répandre; d’où 
les formes humides de cette combustion [...] . On avait l’impres- 
sion d’assister à un travail physiologique effroyable, une torsion 
monstrueuse des tissus internes’ (p. 108). One is willing to 
accept that the actor in question was trying a little too hard, but 
not even the most ardent practitioners of method-acting have yet, 
to my knowledge, mastered the art of spontaneous combustion! 
A similar device can be seen at work in Barthes’s hyperbolic 
assessment of the physical torments experienced by ‘un peuple 
d’hommes d’affaires’ for whom thinking is: ‘une opération vio- 
lente, cataclysmique, dont la sueur est le moindre signe’ (p. 29). 
It is difficult to resist, finally, the reconstituted myth of the 
Olympian actor: ‘la face de l’acteur semble rejoindre sa demeure 
céleste dans une ascension sans hâte et sans muscles, au con- 
traire de l’humanité spectatrice qui, appartenant à une classe 
zoologique différente et n’étant apte au mouvement que par les 
jambes (et non par le visage), doit regagner à pied son apparte- 
ment’ (p. 25). We have here a veritable catalogue of literary 
devices. The use of ‘face’ instead of the more normal ‘visage’ 
serves to reinforce the bogus divinity of the actor: ‘face’, as well 
as being used to designate the masks of certain animals, is the 
word reserved in the French translation of the Bible for the coun­
tenance of God; the (mythical) gulf between the actor and the 
rest of us mere mortals is underlined by the contrast between the 
humorously overstated divinity of the actor and the understated 
humanity of the theatre-goers (‘une classe zoologique . . .’); 
finally, the overblown, mock-scientific language is deflated in 
extremis by the bathetic opposition between ‘demeure céleste’ and
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‘appartement’. A similar effect of bathos, or perhaps inverted 
bathos, is achieved in the opening of ‘Le vin et le lait’ where 
Barthes states that wine is felt to be a national property ‘au 
même titre que ses trois cent soixante espèces de fromages et sa 
culture’ (p. 74). Here, the seemingly ludicrous rapprochement 
between Culture and cheese serves to shock us into recognizing 
the nationalistic myth in which they really are equivalent.
Perhaps the most spectacular devices in Mythologies are 
those that bear not on discursive structures, but on the word it­
self: Mythologies is crawling with mutant adjectival and substan­
tive life-forms. Barthes had a self-professed love of neologisms. 
His coinages include ‘francité’, ‘romanité’, ‘mathématicité’, 
‘gouvemementalité’, ‘basquité’, ‘sinité’, even the splendidly 
self-parodic ‘bouvard-et-pécuchéité’. He points out in ‘le mythe, 
aujourd’hui’ that these ‘barbaric’ forms are necessary in order 
for him to be able to name myths: the dictionary is of little use 
when one is dealing with the nebulous (and constantly renewed) 
meanings of mythical concepts. But this explanation seems less 
apposite to the essays themselves, where the theoretical frame­
work of the postface is absent. Two other explanations suggest 
themselves. The first is that Barthes’s neologisms are the expres­
sion of the pure joy of inventiveness, the joy of writing. But one 
could also argue that these words have a tactical value. In the Es
sais critiques, Barthes notes that ‘l’objet classique secrète fatale- 
ment son adjectif [. . .] Robbe-Grillet poursuit cette fatalité, son 
analyse est une opération anti-coagulante’ (3, p. 36). It is possi­
ble that Barthes sees his own use of neologisms, archaisms, and 
technical terms -  drawn, for the most part, from philosophy, lin­
guistics and psychoanalysis -  as a similar kind of anti-coagulant 
operation. Admittedly, the meaning of these strange nouns, 
adjectives and verbs is not normally hard to fathom, as they are 
invariably generated according to isomorphic principles: ‘cryp- 
tuaire’ (by analogy with ‘crépusculaire’), or ‘gestuaire’ (by anal­
ogy with ‘dictionnaire’); ‘tendreur’, which conflates ‘tendresse’ 
and ‘douceur’ to suggest the human warmth of wood, as opposed 
to the inhuman coldness of plastic; ‘réifier’ and ‘classifier’ (in 
the odd sense of ‘divided into social classes’) which follow the 
pattern of adding ‘-ifier’ to a noun in order to create a verb. But
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comprehensible as they may be, they bring the reader up short, 
capture his attention, and alert him to the fact that here -  unlike 
in myth -  ‘à la surface du langage, quelque chose bouge’.
The frequent use of amphibology needs to be added to this 
catalogue of tactics. A particularly fine specimen closes the 
essay on ‘Le vin et le lait’: ‘[la production du vin] participe lour- 
dement du capitalisme français, que ce soit celui des bouilleurs 
de cru ou celui des grands colons algériens qui imposent au 
musulman, sur la terre même dont on l 'a dépossédé, une culture 
dont il n’a que faire, lui qui manque de pain’ (p. 77). The word 
‘culture’ (crop and culture) encapsulates perfectly, by its very 
ambiguity, the thrust of Barthes’s essay, which is to demonstrate 
the real nature of ‘cultural alibis’.
A review, however cursory, of Barthes’s stylistic arsenal 
would not be complete without at least a mention of his reinven­
tion of obsolete literary forms; the dictionary form, for example, 
which is used sparingly but to great humorous effect. I have 
already had occasion to mention (in Chapter 2) the lexicon of 
colonialist key-words that Barthes compiles in ‘Grammaire 
africaine’; he uses the device again in ‘Le Tour de France 
comme épopée’, which concludes with a le x iq u e  d e s  c o u r e u r s .  
Some of the entries rival Flaubert’s Dictionnaire des idées reçues 
in their laconic stupidity:
C o l e t t o .  Coureur le plus élégant du Tour.
D e G r o o t .  Rouleur solitaire, tacitume batave.
M o lin e r i s .  L’homme du demier kilomètre, (pp. 120-21)
Given that the full force of Barthes’s rhetoric, like myth itself, is 
received and not read, one feels that the most desirable, if least 
practical, solution would be to quote the whole book . . .
iii) D enotation/D etonation
In a much later work Barthes finds a characteristic metaphor 
to describe his oeuvre to date: ‘Le mouvement de son oeuvre est
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tactique: il s’agit de se déplacer, de barrer, comme aux barres, 
mais non de conquérir’ (9, p. 175). This takes up a distinction 
made nearly twenty years earlier in ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’. 
There Barthes describes myth on the Left as tactical rather than 
strategic (p. 235): although the Left may have occasional re­
course to myth, there is nothing in the nature of the Left that im­
plies myth as its necessary form of expression; unlike the Right, 
for which myth is an organic ideological form. It seems that 
strategy, for Barthes, is linked with the idea of victory. This is 
why his approach in Mythologies is tactical rather than strategic: 
he does not believe in the final victory. If myth will only disap­
pear along with the economic base it is designed to reproduce 
and perpetuate, it follows that victory will come only with 
the Revolution. But Barthes does not believe in the Revolution. 
It must be said that the concluding pages of ‘Le mythe, 
aujourd’hui’ do not exactly ooze confidence in the inevitability 
of Revolution: ‘Le mythologue n’est même pas dans une situa­
tion moïséenne: il ne voit pas la Terre promise. Pour lui, la posi
tivité de demain est entièrement cachée par la négativité d’au
jourd’hui’ (p. 246). Barthes was a man of little faith, but I do not 
intend this as a criticism. It is perfectly possible to use a philos­
ophy such as Marxism without subscribing to its every last tenet. 
Unless, of course, you are working within a particularly ortho­
dox party organization: this is why the most interesting left-wing 
thought in the 1940s and ’50s was elaborated outside the PCF, 
on the margins of orthodoxy.
If myth is ubiquitous, the only way to escape it is to be per­
petually elsewhere, or nowhere: utopia. The varous utopias in 
which Barthes takes refuge could also be seen to have a tactical 
value. I will examine just one: literality, or language cleansed of 
connotation, reduced to an edenic innocence, a language which 
acts the world’ rather than just talking about it. In this sense, 
Barthes s praise of Camus’s ‘écriture blanche’ in Le Degré zéro, 
or his promotion of Robbe-Grillet’s ‘littérature littérale’ in the 
Essais critiques, can be seen in retrospect to have a similar tacti­
cal value. This is a point which was not lost on Robbe-Grillet 
himself, who wrote subsequently: ‘Ma prétendue blancheur — qui 
n’était que la couleur de mon armure — venait à point nomine
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pour alimenter son [i.e Barthes’s] discours’ (26, p. 38). This nos­
talgia for an original ‘innocence’ of language hovers over the 
whole of Mythologies. Occasionally it conies into focus, in 
‘Minou Drouet’ for example: ‘c’est [la littéralité] seule pourtant 
qui peut ôter à la métaphore poétique son artifice, la révèler 
comme la fulguration d’une vérité, conquise sur une nausée con­
tinue du langage’ (p. 158). Or in ‘L’art vocal bourgeois’, where 
he praises the ‘literality’ of Panzéra’s singing style (p. 170). 
Robbe-Grillet’s writing was, of course, no more ‘literal’ than any 
other, and Panzéra’s vocal style was as ‘expressive’, in its own 
way, as Souzay’s. Barthes recognizes this when he talks about the 
inevitable ‘expressivité de la langue’ (p. 218). But this particular 
utopia seems to hold a deep attraction for Barthes, and one 
which goes beyond its tactical usefulness as antidote to the 
‘nausée continue du langage’.
There is a veritable myth of the object-language in Mythol­
ogies. In ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’, Barthes asks us to consider 
the politics of tree-felling (destruction of the rain forests was not 
high on the political agenda at the time!): let us imagine, says 
Barthes, that I am a lumberjack, and that I name the tree I’m 
about to fell: ‘[mon langage] me présente la nature dans la 
mesure seulement où je vais la transformer, c’est un langage par 
lequel j ’agis l’objet’ (p. 233). But here is Barthes back in his 
smoky study, scribbling away on the end-product of the wood­
cutter’s labour: ‘face au langage réel du bûcheron, je crée un lan­
gage second, un méta-langage, dans lequel je vais agir, non les 
choses, mais leurs noms, et qui est au langage premier ce que le 
geste est à l’acte’ (p. 233). The myth of object-language might 
then be a ‘personal myth’: an antidote to the uncertainty Barthes 
clearly felt about the ‘use-value’ of his own activity. The similar­
ity with Sartre, again, is striking: the latter also harboured an 
inferiority complex towards the proletariat: the worker was felt 
to enjoy direct access to the stuff of reality, and this lent him a 
solidity, a real-ness to which the intellectual, who was always 
working at one remove from reality, could not hope to accede.
This is, of course, nonsense: as if the woodcutter were only a 
producer, as if he too were not obliged to exchange his product 
against the products of others! Moreover, one lesson of Mythol­-
70 Mythologies
ogies -  and it leaps out from every page -  is that this unmediated 
contact with reality is not possible in the society in which we 
live, if it ever was . . . And yet this nostalgia for a golden age of 
language, which merges into a nostalgia for the Arcadia of pre­
industrial society, coupled with a scarcely disguised envy of 
those whose work involves material production, resurfaces at the 
end of the book where Barthes laments the alienation from ‘the 
real’ which is the unfortunate correlate of his critical position: 
‘Le mécano, l’ingénieur, l’usager même parlent l’objet; le 
mythologue, lui, est condamné au méta-langage’ (p. 246). But 
curiously, this ‘mythologue’ is a fictional character, who bears 
only a passing resemblance to the écrivain who wrote Mythol­
ogies.
The problem, if there is one, lies more at the theoretical than 
the practical level. The (semiological) theory of myth (see Chap­
ter 1) is itself balanced precariously atop an unexploded myth: 
the myth of object-language, or denotation as a ‘natural state 
of language’. When Barthes uses images of ‘rape, prostitution, 
criminality, sacrilege, corruption, vampirism, slavery and 
parasitism’ (20, p. 114) to describe the operation whereby myth 
preys on object-language, he ascribes to the latter, by impli­
cation, the qualities of innocence, purity and integrity; this is a 
pre-lapsarian utopia: there are no myths inside the gates of Eden.
‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’ leads into a theoretical dead end: 
‘nous voguons sans cesse entre l’objet et sa démystification, 
impuissants à rendre sa totalité: car si nous pénétrons l’objet 
[idéologiser], nous le libérons mais nous le détruisons; et si nous 
lui laissons son poids [poétiser], nous le respectons, mais nous le 
restituons encore mystifié’ (p. 247). Esthetics or ethics, sarcasm 
or revolution, description or explication, literature or science. 
The alternatives retain a meaning only if one believes that deno­
tation is the truth of language’. To rid oneself of this belief 
involves putting a bomb under the sign itself. The resulting 
explosion has a name, and it is left hanging as the ‘final word’ of 
Barthes s 1970 preface to Mythologies: sémioclastie.
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‘Je me souviens de: “Dop Dop Dop, adoptez le shampoo­
ing Dop".'
Georges Perec
T he publication of Mythologies in 1957 did not quite mark the 
end of Barthes’s involvement with the genre. Between 
March and November 1959 a second series of ‘petites mythol­
ogies du mois’ was published in Les Lettres Nouvelles. That ap­
peared to be it, until twenty years later, in 1978, he unexpectedly 
returned to the charge. Towards the end of that year, Barthes ap­
proached Jean Daniel, the editor of Le Nouvel Observateur, with 
a view to writing a new series of weekly mythologies. The pieces 
appeared for fifteen weeks, between December 1978 and March 
1979, at which date they were discontinued by mutual agree­
ment. It is fair to say that these new mythologies had been a dis­
appointment to all concerned, not least the readers. Calvet 
echoes the majority of commentators when he points to the 
changed political situation in France as a reason for this failure: 
‘les issues gauchistes ne sont désormais plus guére concevables 
et l’intellectuel “critique”, s’il existe toujours, vit dans une soc
iété dont il accepte les principes’ (16, p. 276). Substantially the 
same point emerges from Roger’s comments on Barthes’s inabil­
ity to find the tone of the earlier essays: ‘leur écriture se prive du 
procédé primordial des Mythologies: ce déclic final du sens qui 
les bouclait idéologiquement [. . .] prenant infailliblement la 
main de la Culture dans le sac de sa naturalisation par la “pensée 
petite-bourgeoise”’ (27, p. 116). In other words, the confidence 
with which the Barthes of 1957 identified his target had guaran­
teed the sureness of his aim. For a variety of reasons, not all of 
them ‘political’, this confidence had been eroded by 1978.
We have seen that Mythologies had a double articulation: 
semiological and ideological, corresponding to the ‘how’ and the
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‘why’ of myth. The evolution of Barthes’s thought in the 1960s 
and 1970s is marked by a radical reflection on the aims and 
limits of semiology, which, I believe, resulted in an inevitable 
broadening of his conception of ideology.
1970 was the year the cock crowed: twice in that year -  in 
the preface to the new edition of Mythologies, and in the pream­
ble to S/Z -  Barthes repudiated, at least partially, his 1957 
Mythologies. A third denial figured in an article published in 
Esprit in April 1971, ‘La Mythologie aujourd’hui’. Thereafter he 
lost no opportunity, in interviews, books and articles, of distanc­
ing himself from the manner, if not the substance of Mythol­
ogies.
The positioning of the new preface to Mythologies is clearly 
significant; coming first, before the original preface and the 
essays themselves, it has the effect of directing one’s reading, of 
pre-empting one’s response to the texts. The laconic first para­
graph, stating simply when the essays were written and pub­
lished, is, ironically, an example of the sort of assertive ‘constat’ 
so frequently denounced in the essays themselves: as if to say: 
‘that was then, this is now’. All the more so since the second 
paragraph does not follow on directly from the first. It is not, 
however, immediately obvious what has changed between 1957 
and 1970: the two, ‘gestes’ which were at the origin of Mythol­
ogies (semiology and ideology) could not, we are told, be repeat­
ed today in the same manner. But it is not that the object, myth, 
has disappeared, nor that it no longer needs combating, nor even 
that a conjugation of ideology and semiology is no longer the 
means to this end. So what has changed? Clearly, the precise 
meaning Barthes now gives to these terms. Semiology itself ‘est 
devenue le lieu théorique où peut se jouer, en ce siècle et dans 
notre Occident, une certaine libération du signifiant. [. . .] pas de 
dénonciation sans son instrument d’analyse fine, pas de sémiolo
gie qui finalement ne s’assume comme une sémioclastie’ (pp. 7-8). B
ut these vague indications as to what this sémioclastie might 
entail are not enlarged upon in this preface. For further details, 
the reader is obliged to apply to ‘La Mythologie aujourd’hui’. 
It is here that Barthes crosses the t ’s and dots the i’s, provid­
ing a more substantial account of the evolution in his position.
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The same points that he made in the preface are rehearsed in this 
article: ‘Il y a toujours, abondant, du mythique dans notre soc- 
iété: également anonyme, retors, fragmenté, bavard, offert à la 
fois à une critique idéologique et à un démontage sémiologique’ 
(11, p. 80). What has changed, it seems, is that semiology itself 
has started to reflect on its own assumptions: ‘Ce ne sont plus les 
mythes qu’il faut démasquer [. . .] c’est le signe lui-même qu’il 
faut ébranler: non pas révéler le sens (latent) d’un énoncé, d’un 
trait, d un récit, mais fissurer la représentation même du sens; 
non pas changer ou purifier les symboles, mais contester le sym- 
bolique lui-même [. . .] à la “mythoclastie” succède [. . .] une 
“sémioclastie” ’ (11, pp. 80-81).
In simple terms, what can this mean? The semiological anal­
ysis inaugurated in ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’ hinged on the dis­
tinction between connotation and denotation. The bedrock of this 
schema is the Saussurean concept of the sign, but it is on this 
very conception of the sign that suspicion now falls: is there not, 
in the very nature of the signs of natural language a certain 
mythical predisposition? Even if the signifier and signified are 
meant to be thought of as inseparable, perhaps this schema lends 
itself to a fundamental misapprehension: the notion that the sig­
nified exists autonomously and independently, prior to its entry 
into a signifying network. In Mythologies Barthes wanted to 
denounce a lie, but in order to do this he had to posit some sort 
of truth. The ultimate ‘truth’ was denotation as the ‘truth of 
language’, or language in a state of nature. In retrospect, Barthes 
views his erstwhile distinction between denotation and conno­
tation as a tactic which may have outlived its usefulness: ‘L’op
position n' a donc d’usage que dans le cadre d’une opération 
critique analogue à une expérience d’analyse chimique: chaque 
fois que je crois à la vérité, j ’ai besoin de la dénotation’ (9, p. 71).
Sémioclastie, then, refers to the sundering of this bedrock, 
the radical questioning of this assumption: that the sign could be 
the expression of a natural, essential meaning, somehow existing 
prior to its articulation.
We can now see how the concept of ideology which in­
formed Mythologies had necessarily to undergo a corresponding 
mutation. A certain equivalence is established in Mythologies
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between, on the one hand the ‘innocent’ object-language, and on 
the other, ‘real’ social relations: what is pirated and distorted by 
myth? -  the real, or original meaning of the utterance. What is 
concealed, or inverted, by myth? -  the real relations of produc­
tion obtaining in mass society. As the critique of the sign be­
comes more far-reaching, more radical, so the critique of ideol­
ogy becomes infinitely broader. I am referring here not simply to 
Barthes’s realization that the political Left traded in myth just as 
arrogantly as his ancient bugbear, the bourgeoisie (in any case, 
this had been well recognized in works predating Mythologies, 
such as Le Degré zéro): there is now seen to be a massive covert 
ideological investment in the very concept of the sign itself. On 
this account, the 1970 preface is relatively modest, simply identi­
fying ‘la Norme bourgeoise’ as the ‘ennemi capital’ (p. 8). But 
‘La Mythologie aujourd’hui’ envisages a somewhat wider target: 
‘toute la civilisation occidentale (gréco-judéo-islamo-chré- 
tienne), unifiée sous une même théologie (l’essence, le mono- 
théisme) et identifiée par le régime de sens qu’elle pratique, de 
Platon à France-Dimanche' (11, p. 81).
The article goes on to specify that sémioclastie could take 
two complementary directions in practice. The first would be 
an evaluative typology of discourses, or ‘ideolects’, according 
to their ‘density’; that is to say, how hackneyed, stereotyped 
or sclerotic they are. Here the operative terms of ‘Le mythe, 
aujourd’hui’ -  signifier, signified and signification -  are to be 
replaced by less ‘semiocratic’ operators: quotation, reference 
and stereotype (11, p. 82). The second path would lead to the 
practice of what Barthes calls the Text. There is not the space 
here to explore this notion in any depth, which is perhaps just 
as well, since Text, as a practice, does not by definition lend 
itself easily to critical lucubrations: ‘Le texte scriptible n’est pas 
une chose, on le trouvera mal en librairie. De plus, son modèle 
étant productif (et non représentatif), il abolit toute critique, qui, 
produite, se confondrait avec lu i . . .’ (7, p. 11).
Apart from the radicalization of semiology and ideology, 
there is a third, related reason given for the shift from ‘mythocl
astie’ to ‘sémioclastie’. And this is the most curious of all. 
Mythologies had its emulators, such as Jean-Francis Held in the
columns of Le Nouvel Observateur in the 1960s; and Calvet 
remarks that, strange and rebarbative as Barthes’s style and
approach may have appeared at the time, ‘elles deviendront
très vite le bien commun d’une certaine intelligentsia et semblent
aujourd’hui relever de l’évidence’ (16, p. 161) But this, it seems
was precisely Barthes’s problem. He claims in ‘La Mythologie
aujourd' hui' that fifteen years on there is ‘pas un étudiant qui ne
dénonce le caractère bourgeois ou petit-bourgeois d’une forme
(de vie, de pensée, de consommation)’ (11, p. 80). In the same 
year, 1970, Barthes informs readers of Les Lettres françaises that
this capacity not only to detect myth but also to denounce it, is
now no longer just the preserve of ‘students’ -  even Joe Bloggs 
can do it. ‘tout le monde peut aujourd’hui dénoncer le caractère 
petit-bourgeois d’une forme’ (10, p. 84). In both cases, Barthes’s 
reflex is to go further, and this involves, precisely, the radicaliza
tion of mythology which he calls sémioclastie. These then are 
the main points around which Barthes’s repudiation o f Mythol­
ogies revolves.
The reasons which led Barthes to this radical displacement 
a r e  clear enough. He wrote in L’Empire des signes: ‘il est 
dérisoire de vouloir contester notre société sans jamais penser les 
limites mêmes de la langue par laquelle (rapport instrumental) 
nous pretendons la contester: c’est vouloir détruire le loup en se 
logeant confortablement dans sa gueule’ (6, p. 13). And few 
would doubt that reflexivity is a healthy, indeed necessary, 
a c companiment to any critical activity: one does not need to 
evoke ‘motes’ and ‘beams’ in order to appreciate the arrogance 
o f  a  critic who doubts everything save the validity of his own 
unexamined assumptions. But here again, I wonder whether an 
undoubted radicality at the level of theory might not disguise a 
withdrawal from activism at the level of practice. The enterprise 
de-mythologizing is already, pace Barthes, difficult and de
manding enough, but the enterprise of sémioclastie is so vast 
that it looks suspiciously like yet another utopia. Moreover, there 
is something slightly disquieting about Barthes’s desire always to 
go further: ‘La démystification (ou démythification) est devenue 
elle-même discours, corpus de phrases, énoncé catéchistique; en 
face de quoi, la science du signifiant ne peut que se déplacer et
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s’arrêter (provisoirement) plus loin’ (11, p. 80). The point is 
taken: as predicted in Mythologies itself, what started as a 
subversive tactic has become hardened, frozen into mannerism; 
demythification has entered the realm of ce-qui-va-de-soi. But 
the above quotation also expresses a desire to be one step ahead, 
to be, literally, in the avant-garde. Barthes had long before given 
a scathing assessment of the political nullity of all avant-gardes: 
‘l'avant-garde, ce n ’est au fond qu’un phénomène cathartique de 
plus, une sorte de vaccine destinée à inoculer un peu de subjec­
tivité, un peu de liberté sous la croûte des valeurs bourgeoises’, 
and ‘il vient toujours un moment où l’Ordre récupère ses francs
tireurs’ (3, p. 81).
And so, finally, to the miraculous acquisition by the man-in- 
the-street of the capacity to denounce myth wherever he might 
encounter it. This is marvellous news. It is a shame that some­
body forgot to tell the millions of Americans who thought that 
the Gulf war was being fought in defence of Democracy and 
Freedom. Closer to home, one wonders what became of this 
piercing lucidity in the case of a British electorate which voted 
in a ‘piggy-bank Poujadist’, 7 three times, in the belief that a new 
era of Freedom and Choice for the Individual was about to dawn.
These objections all centre on the question of ‘point of 
view’. In ‘Le mythe, aujourd’hui’ Barthes wrote: ‘Si l 'on veut 
rattacher le schème mythique à une histoire générale ,  expliquer 
comment il répond à l’intérêt d’une société définie, bref passer 
de la sémiologie à l’idéologie, c’est évidemment au niveau de la 
troisième accommodation qu’il faut se placer: c’est le lecteur de 
mythes lui-même qui doit en révéler la fonction essentielle’ (p. 
215). This was the sense of the tactical espousal of a Marxist 
class position in Mythologies. Perhaps the notion of sémioclastie 
and the practice of ‘Text’, impeccable as they may be as theoret­
ical constructs, create a utopian space for writers, but in a soci­
ety where mass illiteracy appears at times to be a government 
policy-objective, one wonders what space is left for the reader, 
let alone the mystified receiver.
7 Dennis Healey's amusing, if somewhat inaccurate description of Margaret Thatcer.
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So where does this leave Mythologies today? Statistically, the 
popularity of Mythologies is undiminished: it is still the most 
widely read of all Barthes’s books, both in French and in transla­
tion. But this does not tell us very much about how Mythologies 
is read today, about how it is appropriated by its readers. It is 
something of a truism to say that any given work has as many 
potential ‘readings’ as it has readers -  this is a view of the liter­
ary text, moreover, which the work of Barthes, among others 
has done much to promote. Depending on the angle from which 
one chooses to approach Mythologies, it is variously: a seminal 
work of ideological discourse-analysis; a ground-breaking study 
in the semiotics of everyday life; a chronicle of the first half of 
the 1950s: colonial wars and decolonization, the emergence of 
the ‘Third World’ (Bandung), the Cold War. It can also be read, 
now, as kind of repository of collective memory; a sort of Je me 
souviens. micro-memories common to a generation, and which 
constituted the actuality of that generation: gangster films, 
advertising jingles, books, exhibitions and plays, a fateful glass 
of milk, once famous cyclists who have long since dismounted 
for ever . . .  It is also a dazzling display of literary criticism, an 
object-lesson in how to read — this alone should ensure its place 
on the syllabus of any self-respecting undergraduate literature 
course. It is perhaps also, some would say, a strange, new kind of
novel, with fifty-three chapters and an epilogue. And doubtless 
more besides.
The rather dismissive tone of Barthes’s own retrospective 
commentaries on Mythologies need not substantially affect the 
freedom of the reader with regard to the text: despite the author­
ity which still seems inevitably to adhere to an author’s pro­
nouncements, the latter is essentially in no more privileged a 
position vis-à-vis his own text than any other reader. Moreover, 
Barthes's 're-reading’ o f Mythologies after 1970 could itself be 
seen as a dramatization of, yet another of, the lessons taught by 
that text: that to read is to transform, both the text and oneself as 
reading subject. The texts which constitute this re-reading of 
Mythologies all signify a desire to gather up the past and recast it 
in such a way that it can be integrated into a new project, a new 
image. Or perhaps, paradoxically, in such a way that the tempta­
tion of the Image is itself defused . . .
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In short, Mythologies is not a closed text: no text is, not even 
the classical one. Two very different ways in which Mythologies 
was appropriated by ‘active’ readers, within just a few years of 
its publication, are illustrated by what could be called ‘a tale of
two GPs’.
In July 1963, Cahiers de la publicité published a piece by 
Barthes on ‘Le message publicitaire’. This caught the eye of 
Georges Péninou, who knew Barthes as the author of Mythol­
ogies, and who was at that time employed as director of research 
at France’s biggest advertising agency, Publicis. Since 1962, 
Barthes had been director of studies in ‘sociologie des signes et 
représentations’ at the prestigious, if rather marginal, Ecole pra­
tique des hautes études; Péninou went along to Barthes’s seminar 
in 1964, was impressed, and in due course signed up for a thesis 
on the semiology of advertising. In addition, and most ironically, 
Péninou procured a contract for Barthes with Renault to look 
into the ‘semiology of the automobile’. He accepted. Quite apart 
from the evident irony of the situation -  the ‘mythologue’ snug­
gling down next to the ‘producteur de mythes’ -  this anecdote 
illustrates the fact that the influence of a given work is not at all 
proportionate to the simple number of its readers: ‘influence’ 
very swiftly becomes diffuse and apparently anonymous.
That mythology should find itself in the paid service of the 
very industry responsible for the creation and dissemination of 
myth is doubtless ironic. It is, furthermore, a classic instance of 
what the French call ‘récupération’. Certainly, Louis-Jean Calvet 
sees it this way: ‘Des annonces publicitaires aux campagnes 
électorates, de la vente des petits pois à celle des députés, les 
logothètes [. . .] utilisent en effet gaillardement ce qu’ils croient 
pouvoir retirer de la sémiologie, au point où l’on entend plus 
fréquemment ou presque le terme de connotation dans les stu­
dios de publicité que dans les séminaires de linguistique’ (15, p. 
155). Whatever one may feel about this (and one is entitled to 
wonder, incidentally, precisely what Calvet himself was doing, 
apart from eavesdropping, in these ‘studios de publicité’ . . .), it 
seems inevitable. And for Barthes also: if he desired to be recog­
nized, and recognized as a writer, he must have known that recu­
peration is the price to pay for social recognition, because this is
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yet another lesson of Mythologies: the movement of mass society 
is towards vulgarization and homogenization; the only mar­
ketable commodities are those which have been socialized 
through and through.
As coincidence would have it — and where would a writer in 
search of a nicely rounded conclusion be without coincidence? — 
the 1964 seminar at the EPHE was also attended by a certain 
Georges Perec. At the time Perec was an unpublished author. 
That was to change in 1965 with the publication of his prize- 
winning first novel Les Choses. The influence of Mythologies 
on this book would have been quite manifest, even if Perec had 
not taken the trouble, which he did, of acknowledging his debt: 
the two central characters, Jérôme and Sylvie, are mystified to the 
core of their acquisitive being by the shimmering mirages of the 
consumer society. They may inform themselves by reading Le 
Monde, but they devour Madame Express. The slightly sadistic 
twist is that Perec has them working as market-researchers for 
advertising agencies! Les Choses is a superlative example of pre­
cisely the kind of ‘mythe artificiel’ which Barthes thought was 
probably the only effective way of fighting myth. It also betrays 
the same ambivalence towards ‘things’ that I noted as a feature 
of Mythologies: on the one hand the beauty and fascination of 
material objects, on the other the degraded spectacle of reality. 
The trajectory of Jérôme and Sylvie comes to ground on the 
emptiness, the hollowness, the nothingness of the Image: for 
them at least, reality is always elsewhere.
Two ways of reading Mythologies, two ways of appropriating 
the text to very different ends. To be read is to be recognized, but 
the price of being recognized by Perec is to be recognized by 
Péninou and Publicis.
Perhaps some readers will feel that this confrontation which I 
have engineered between my two GPs is too pat, too comfort­
able: an example of the ‘balance’ (p. 241) so stylishly denounced 
by Barthes himself, and designed to leave me floating above the 
text in a smugly non-judgemental posture. Perhaps this is true. 
So, I’ll conclude with my own chosen epigraph for Mythologies. 
From Sartre:
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Je ne vois partout que formules vieillies, replâtrages, compro
mis sans bonne foi, mythes périmés et repeints à la hâte. Si 
nous n’avions rien fait sauf de crever une à une toutes ces 
vessies pleines de vent, nous aurions bien mérité de nos 
lecteurs. (30, p. 348)
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